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HISTORY AND TRADITION IN
AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE
SAMUEL T. MORISON*
ABSTRACT
At present, there are two military commission cases involving
terrorism defendants incarcerated at Guantánamo Bay making
their way through the appellate courts. In both cases, the
defendants are challenging their convictions for “providing
material support for terrorism.” While this is a federal offense that
could be prosecuted in an Article III court, the legal issue in these
appeals is whether providing material support is also a war crime
subject to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal. Congress
incorporated the offense into the Military Commissions Act, but
that is not dispositive, since it is arguably beyond Congress’s
legislative competence to create war crimes out of whole cloth and
then impose them on foreign nationals having no jurisdictional
nexus to the United States.
As a result, the Government has not disputed that there must
be at least some historical evidence that the conduct now styled
“providing material support” to an enemy previously has been
treated as a war crime, where the defendant was a non-resident
alien who owed no duty of allegiance to the injured state. In what
might be fairly described as a desperate attempt to discharge its
burden of persuasion, the Government has now embraced the only
“precedent” that comes close to fitting this description. This is
problematic, however, because it is also one of the most notorious
episodes in the history of American military justice.
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of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government. The author thanks Mary Dudziak, David
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Sundel for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.
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In 1818, then Major General Andrew Jackson led an armed
invasion of Spanish Florida, thereby instigating the First Seminole
War. In the course of the conflict, his troops captured two British
citizens who had been living in Florida among the Seminole
Indians. In his inimitable style, Jackson impetuously ordered the
summary trial and execution of these men, allegedly for “inciting”
the Seminoles to engage in “savage warfare” against the United
States. Worse yet, Jackson’s immediate motivation for the invasion
was to recapture fugitive slaves, who had escaped from the
adjacent States and found refuge among the Seminoles. In
addition to territorial expansion, his mission was to return this
“property” to their “rightful” owners and prevent Florida from
serving as a safe haven for runaway slaves.
Remarkably, the legal basis of the Government’s assertion of
military jurisdiction over material support charges therefore rests
on Jackson’s decision to execute two men, who were almost
certainly innocent, in the context of a war of aggression waged to
vindicate the property rights of antebellum Southern slaveholders.
The purpose of this essay is to reintroduce the episode to a wider
audience, and to reflect on the implications of the Government’s
decision to rely on it as a precedent for a modern war crimes
prosecution.
“Nations frequently rush into the arms of despotism for the avowed
reason of finding security against anarchy . . . . Liberty requires that
every one should be judged by his common court. All despots insist on
extraordinary courts, courts of commission, and an easy application of
martial law.”1
1.

INTRODUCTION

The outer boundaries of Congress’s discretion to “define and
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations”2 as a matter of
municipal penal legislation remains an open question. In 1865, the
Attorney General put down a marker when he opined that while
Congress has largely unfettered discretion “to make” rules for the
management of the armed forces that did not previously exist, “[t]o
define is to give the limits or precise meaning of a word or thing
1
2

FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 17, 228 (1853).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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[already] in being . . . Congress has the power to define, not to
make, the laws of nations.”3 If the distinction between “making”
and “defining” is substantially correct, it suggests that Congress
has the flexibility to “modify on some points of indifference” when
it acts to incorporate the laws of war into the domestic code, but
could not reasonably be construed as having a license to create
new offenses out of whole cloth under the guise of providing
Insofar as originalism matters in
definitional certainty.4
constitutional interpretation, there is an impressive body of
evidence that supports this reading of the original meaning of the
Define and Punish Clause.5
For this reason, in ongoing litigation under the Military
Commissions Act (MCA),6 the Government has not disputed the

Military Comm’ns, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299 (1865).
See id. (citing Who Privileged From Arrest, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 26, 27 (1792))
(“The law of nations, although not specifically adopted by the constitution or any
municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation
commences and runs with the existence of a nation, subject to modification on
some points of indifference.”).
5 See Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J.
121, 141 (2007).
3
4

[T]his is not to say that the founders intended to give Congress free rein
to determine offenses against the law of nations . . . . It is clear from the
drafting history of the Clause that only offenses established by the
“consent” of nations, to use [Chief Justice] Marshall’s phrase, would
qualify. Congress could not create offenses, but retained only the
second-order authority to assign more definitional certainty to those
offenses already existing under the law of nations at the time it
legislated.
Id.; Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders, Framers, and
Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of Nations, 14
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205, 220, 225 (2008) (“Necessarily, any modification
of the law of nations had to be [on a point] of indifference . . . . Congress was
given a non-exclusive power to ‘define’ or at least to clarify offenses against the
law of nations . . . .”); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s
Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 447, 474 (2000) (“The debates at the Constitutional Convention made clear
that Congress would have the power to punish only actual violations of the law of
nations, not to create new offenses.”).
6 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.), amended by
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–84, tit. 18, 123 Stat. 2574
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). For the purposes of this Article, the
differences between the 2006 and 2009 versions of the MCA need not detain us.
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proposition that there must be at least some relevant historical
evidence that “the conduct now criminalized by the [statute] has
[previously] been recognized as a violation of the law of war.”7
Yet, several of the offenses codified in the MCA notoriously have
no grounding in the standard menu of sources for identifying the
substantive content of customary international law, namely “the
works of jurists,” “the general usage and practice of nations,” and
“judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law.”8 Perhaps
most conspicuously, Congress incorporated the federal crime of
“providing material support for terrorism” into the MCA,9 despite
the fact that this is a novel statutory offense that was not even
conceived until the mid-1990s, and has never been considered a
law-of-war offense by any other nation.10
7 United States v. Hamdan, 2 M.C. 1, 5 (2008). Importantly, the Government
has also conceded that the source of Congress’s authority to enact the MCA is
derived from the Define and Punish Clause. Compare Appellee’s Response to the
Specified Issues at 1–2, United States v. al Bahlul, CMCR Case No. 09–001 (U.S. Ct.
Mil. Comm’n Rev. Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Gov’t Response (al Bahlul)], with
Appellant’s Reply on the Certified Issues, United States v. al Bahlul, CMCR Case
No. 09–001 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Mar. 15, 2011). See also WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d rev. ed. 1920).

The Constitution confers upon Congress the power ‘to define and punish
offences against the law of nations,’ and in the instances of the legislation
of Congress during the [Civil War] by which it was enacted that spies
and guerillas should be punishable by sentence of military commission,
such commission may be regarded as deriving its authority from this
constitutional power.
Id.
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820).
10 U.S.C. § 950(t)(25) (2006) (defining the offense of “providing material
support for terrorism” by reference to the parallel federal criminal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2339A, which was enacted in 1994). To date, most detainees at
Guantánamo Bay, against whom charges have been referred, have been charged
with at least one count of providing material support for terrorism. See U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., OFFICE OF MIL. COMM’N, Military Commissions Cases, available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (providing case files for
Military Commission cases).
10 See Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of Detainees for
Violations of the Law of War: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 111th Cong.
7–9 (2009).
8
9

After careful study, the administration has concluded that appellate
courts may find that “material support for terrorism” . . . is not a
traditional violation of the law of war. The President has made clear that
military commissions are for law of war offenses. We thus believe it
would be best for material support to be removed from the list of
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Remarkably, in what might charitably be described as a
desperate attempt to discharge its burden of persuasion, the
Government has now fully embraced the only “precedent” that
comes close to fitting this description. This is problematic,
however, because it is also one of the most notorious episodes in
the annals of American military justice. In 1818, then Major
General Andrew Jackson led an armed invasion of Spanish Florida,
thereby instigating what historians have since designated the First
Seminole War. In the course of the conflict, his troops captured
two British citizens, Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert Ambrister,
who had been living in Indian Territory before the outbreak of the
war. In his inimitable style, Jackson managed to precipitate a
major international incident, as well as the first full-scale
congressional investigation in the nation’s history, when he
impetuously ordered the summary trial and execution of these
men, allegedly for “inciting” the Seminoles and their black allies to
engage in “savage warfare” against the United States. If the
jingoistic overtone does not seem like a promising beginning to the
story, it gets worse.
William Winthrop, who is widely
offenses triable by military commission, which would fit better with the
statute’s existing declarative statement.
Id. (statement of Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def.).
[T]here are serious questions as to whether material support for
terrorism or terrorist groups is a traditional violation of the law of war . .
. . Although identifying traditional law of war offenses can be a difficult
legal and historical exercise, our experts believe that there is a significant
risk that appellate courts will ultimately conclude that material support
for terrorism is not a traditional law of war offense, thereby reversing
hard-won convictions and leading to questions about the system’s
legitimacy.
Id. at 9–12 (statement of David S. Kris, Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., Dep’t
of Justice); JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40752, THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006: BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 10 (2009)
(“[D]efining as a war crime the ‘material support for terrorism’ does not appear to
be supported by historical precedent.”); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, Human Rights Council, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3 (Nov.
22, 2007) (by Martin Scheinin) (“[T]he offences listed in Section [950t](24)–(28) of
the [MCA] (terrorism, providing material support for terrorism, wrongfully
aiding the enemy, spying, and conspiracy) go beyond offences under the laws of
war.”); David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over
the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 177 (2008)
(“[W]hile providing material support to terrorism is clearly an offense against U.S.
federal law, its trial as a war crime seems unprecedented.”).
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acknowledged to be the leading authority on American military
law,11 actually concluded that Jackson himself was guilty of murder
for ordering the execution of Ambrister contrary to the court
martial’s verdict.12
Although Jackson’s role in the executions of Arbuthnot and
Ambrister is perhaps familiar ground for scholars who specialize
in antebellum American history, the Government’s decision to rely
on the incident to legitimize a modern war crimes prosecution
casts it in an entirely new light. The purpose of this Article, then, is
to reintroduce the episode to a wider audience, and to reflect on
implications of the Government’s decision to invoke the case for
the contemporary use of military commissions. Part 2 briefly sets
the stage by situating the discussion in the context of the
justification of the State’s imposition of criminal sanctions as such.
Part 3 explains the Government’s theory for the extraordinary
assertion of military jurisdiction over non-resident aliens who
provide material support to those engaged in hostilities against the
United States. The heart of the Article is Parts 4 and 5, which
examine in some detail Jackson’s conduct of the First Seminole War
and the court martial proceedings resulting in the executions of
Arbuthnot and Ambrister. Finally, I conclude that the prosecutors’
dubious invocation of this case, purportedly in furtherance of the
public good, reveals the moral bankruptcy of its legal position.
2.

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND THE PRACTICE OF
PUNISHMENT

The nature and source of political obligation has been a vexing
theoretical question since at least the seventeenth century, when
Thomas Hobbes suggested that the best way to quell religiously
inspired violence was to submit all questions of social morality to
the Sovereign’s unfettered discretion.13 As we know from bitter
experience, this doesn’t work. To be sure, the threat of coercion
11 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) (referring to Winthrop as
“the Blackstone of Military Law” (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38
(1957))).
12 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 464–65 (describing Jackson’s order to execute
Ambrister as “wholly arbitrary and illegal,” and opining that “[f]or such an order
and its execution a military commander would now be indictable for murder”).
13 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962)
(1651).
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might be sufficient to induce compliance in the short run, but no
government, even the most autocratic, can in the long run govern
exclusively through brute force. This is true for the simple reason
that the actual exercise of political power is continuously
dependent on the willingness of substantial numbers of people to
comply with the dictates of the regime, including, among others,
“the hand that holds the key, the judge that shuffles the papers,
and the person who chooses whether or not to file charges.”14
Power alone thus cannot be the exclusive source of the obligation
of obedience, contra Hobbes, since that power itself is the product
of widespread allegiance to the State.
As such, the official infliction of criminal sanctions is never
merely a naked instrument for utilizing collective violence as a
means of exercising social control. Instead, as Keally McBride has
persuasively argued, the practice of punishment is also the
simultaneous expression of the ideals inherent in a political order,
the manifestation of some greater good that purports to justify the
State’s exercise of coercive authority over the lives and property of
those subject to its jurisdiction, “whether that be service to God,
impartial courts, the light of reason, or the necessity of power.”15
The bureaucrats who administer the system of punishment must
therefore “demonstrate that they deserve their unique privileges
because they serve the larger interest of justice . . . . As soon as
punishment is entirely about the power of command[,] it . . . will
quickly destroy the tenuous connection between power and justice
cultivated by all regimes.”16
Accordingly, a regime stakes its legitimacy on the extent to
which its penal practices conform to its professed ideals. Where
theory and practice persistently conflict, the resulting cognitive
dissonance tends to undermine the stability of the legal system
and, in extreme cases, provokes active resistance. In Hannah
Arendt’s striking phrase, a vibrant public sphere can be
maintained “only where word and deed have not parted company,
where words are not empty and deeds not brutal . . . .”17 Where
this “tenuous connection” is broken, and public discourse about

14
15
16
17

KEALLY MCBRIDE, PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL ORDER 79 (2007).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 150.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 200 (1958).
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social justice comes to be widely regarded as insincere and
oppressive, the resulting distrust will invariably cause civic life to
be governed by force and violence rather than persuasion.
The practice of punishment thus involves an intricate balancing
act in which the state attempts to fill the normative gap between an
ideal of social order and the disorderly reality of the human
condition. In the United States, the animating political creed
includes above all a basic commitment to the inherent moral
equality of each individual. This principle is affirmed, for
example, in the enigmatic rhetoric of the Declaration of
Independence.
But it would be anachronistic to read the
Declaration’s famous assertion that “all men are created equal” as
an endorsement of the modern conception of egalitarianism.18
Instead, it was meant in the classical liberal sense that no one is
by nature subject to the authority of another person without his
consent, and that political freedom consists in preserving the
security of natural rights under the rule of law. “Freedom of Men
under Government,” Locke wrote, “is, to have a standing Rule to
live by, common to every one of that Society . . . A Liberty to follow
my own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not
to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will
of another Man.”19 Hence, Francis Lieber’s maxim that civil liberty
depends on the existence of a “common court” to adjudicate legal
disputes, as opposed to an “easy application” of ad hoc military
tribunals.20
18 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776). As John Diggins
points out, it was Lincoln, not Jefferson, who transformed our understanding of
the Declaration “by explaining equality as a moral imperative rather than as a
scientific postulate, an ideal to be pursued rather than a fact to be assumed, a
‘proposition’ rather than a truism.” John P. Diggins, Slavery, Race, and Equality:
Jefferson and the Pathos of the Enlightenment, 28 AM. Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 206, 217
(1976).
19 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 302 (Peter Laslett ed. 1960)
(1690).
20 See LIEBER, supra note 1, at 228 (“Liberty requires that every one should be
judged by his common court. All despots insist on extraordinary courts, courts of
commission, and an easy application of martial law.”).

[T]he law shall be superior to all and every one and every branch of
government; that there is nowhere a mysterious, supreme and
unattainable power, which, despite of the clearest law, may still dispense
with it, or arrest its course. This is the sum total of modern civil liberty,
the great, firm, and solid commons’ liberty.
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On the Lockean account, when human beings quit the state of
nature and enter into civil society, it is rational for them to “give up
. . . [the] power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall
be appointed to it amongst them; and by such Rules as the
Community, or those authorised by them to that purpose, shall
agree on.”21 Each member of a political community thus alienates
or transfers his or her natural right to punish those who violate
their rights to the State, which is charged with the responsibility to
exercise this “executive power” on their behalf in furtherance of
“the common good.”22 In this view, the practice of punishment is
thus legitimate insofar as it secures “the two core elements of a
liberal regime,” namely “the rights of individuals and the bounds
upon state power.”23
Broadly speaking, these principles find constitutional
expression in a complex web of institutions that are meant to
demarcate a robust sphere of personal liberty, ranging from the
prohibitions on ex post facto prosecution, compelled selfincrimination and cruel punishments to the guarantees of equal
protection and trial by a politically independent judiciary. As
George Kateb reminds us:
Whatever the actual adherence to these ideals by officials of
the law . . . the Constitution’s system of criminal law is a
model of almost delicate restraint and inhibition in the
exercise of state power and hence in the manner in which
those who are caught in the toils of the law are to be
treated.24
As Kateb suggests, the point of imposing such procedural
constraints on the State’s prosecution of crime is not merely to
protect the rights of the innocent or the truth-finding function of a
trial, as opposed to the preservation of other social values. For
example, the normative justification of the privilege against self-

2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 294 (1839).
21 LOCKE, supra note 19, at 370.
22 See id. at 347, 368, 389 (discussing generally individuals’ surrender of the
right to punish wrongdoers to an executive authority as part of the Lockean social
contract).
23 MCBRIDE, supra note 14, at 122.
24 George Kateb, Punishment and the Spirit of Democracy, 74 SOC. RES. 269, 276
(2007).
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incrimination is not solely to avoid the risk of false convictions. On
the contrary, practicing lawyers are typically reluctant to allow
their clients to testify precisely because it might prove too
revealing.
Rather, the injunction against self-incrimination arises largely
because there is something deeply disquieting about the State’s
coercing even a guilty person to implicate himself in a crime. From
a liberal perspective anyway, such a spectacle is offensive because
it is degrading and accords insufficient respect for the equal worth
of the defendant as a member of the moral community,
notwithstanding his offense.
Indeed, even Hobbes, though
frequently portrayed as an apologist for absolutism, maintained
that an individual has an inalienable right of self-preservation and
is thus never required to cooperate in his own punishment.25 This
remains true, even though faithful adherence to such constraints
almost certainly frustrates the State’s efforts to give the guilty the
punishment they arguably deserve.
In this way, then,
constitutional norms establish a moral minimum that the State may
not transgress in the pursuit of social order, thereby preserving
and to some extent instantiating competing moral values like
respect and personal dignity.
3.

AIDING THE ENEMY UNDER THE LAW OF WAR

In the grand tradition of American military justice, the
foregoing principles of legality have been extended even to enemy
aliens captured on the battlefield, much less to civilian noncombatants. “These principles would reach every man’s case,”
Henry Clay said in 1819, “native or foreigner, citizen or alien. The
instant quarters are granted to a prisoner, the majesty of the law
surrounds and sustains him, and he cannot lawfully be punished”
unless “the law condemns [his actions] and . . . [the sentence] is
pronounced by that tribunal which is authorized by the law to try
him.”26
Yet, the continuing vitality of these ideals is thrown into stark
relief by the Government’s contemporary invocation of military

25 For an illuminating discussion of Hobbes’s philosophy of punishment, see
Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601
(2009).
26 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 645 (1819) (statement of Henry Clay).
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commissions in the ongoing “war on terrorism.” Historically,
Congress had incorporated the entire corpus of the common law of
war into the Articles of War by oblique reference, leaving it to the
courts to assess the application of the law on a case-by-case basis.27
In sharp contrast, the MCA adds an entirely new subchapter to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which applies only to
non-citizens deemed to be “unprivileged belligerents,” who are
subjected to trial by military commission for thirty specific
statutory law-of-war offenses.28 In a transparent attempt to
insulate the statute from serious jurisdictional and ex post facto
challenges,29 Congress disclaimed that it had engaged in any
legislative innovation when codifying these offenses in the MCA.30

27 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) (“By the Articles of War, and
especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may
constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.”). When the
Articles of War were reenacted as the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950,
Congress retained this provision (now codified as Article 21), which “preserved
what power, under the Constitution and the common law of war, the President
[previously] had had before 1916 to convene military commissions—with the
express condition that the President and those under his command comply with
the law of war.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2006).
28 See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2009) (defining “unprivileged enemy belligerent as
one who has engaged in hostilities against or has purposefully and materially
supported hostiles against the United States, or was a part of al Qaeda); 10 U.S.C.
§ 948c (2009) (subjecting alien unprivileged enemy belligerents to trial by a
military commission); 10 U.S.C. § 950t(1)–(30) (2009) (listing offenses triable by
military commission).
29 See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of
Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 151 (2009) (arguing that the “Define
and Punish Clause limits Congress's power to criminalize conduct that lacks a
U.S. nexus.”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on
Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295 (2010) (detailing the legal history
of and constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction of military commissions).
30 See 10 U.S.C. § 950p(d) (2009).

The provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally
been triable by military commission. This chapter does not establish new
crimes that did not exist before the date of the enactment of this
subchapter . . . but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military
commission. Because the provisions of this subchapter codify offenses
that have traditionally been triable under the law of war or otherwise
triable by military commission, this subchapter does not preclude trial
for offenses that occurred before the date of the enactment of this
subchapter . . . .
Id.
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Of course, the mere fact that Congress says so does not
necessarily make it true, ipse dixit. Indeed, the most natural
reading of the statute’s declarative statement is that Congress must
have intended the offenses enumerated in the MCA to possess a
certain historical pedigree in international humanitarian law. In an
effort to discharge this jurisdictional burden, the Government has
taken the position that the offense of providing material support
for terrorism as codified in the MCA is—in substance if not in
name—a version of “aiding the enemy,” which does have a
longstanding provenance in American military law.31
Taken at face value, this is a singularly unconvincing
argument. Logically, it begs the question to suggest that an enemy
alien violates the injunction against “aiding the enemy” by
providing material support to his own co-belligerents, at least in
the absence of special circumstances giving rise to a duty of
allegiance to the injured State. Without this factual predicate, the
concept of “aiding the enemy” would have no limiting principle.
In that case, it would follow that any enemy alien, including the
members of an enemy’s armed forces, could be subjected to
prosecution for war crimes merely for engaging in hostilities
against the United States, even if the conduct at issue otherwise
scrupulously complied with the laws of war. But this amounts to
the absurd proposition that United States may unilaterally declare
itself to be legally immune tout court from the hazards of armed
conflict. No plausible construction of the law of war supports such
a conclusion.
Rather, as William Winthrop explained more than a century
ago, the prohibition on aiding the enemy is grounded in the rule of
non-intercourse, a principle of customary international law which
provides that “all the inhabitants of the belligerent nations or
districts become, upon the declaration or initiation of a foreign
war, or of a civil war, . . . the enemies both of the adverse
government and of each other, and all intercourse between them is
31 See Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 21 (“Appellant’s material
support for terrorism can legitimately be characterized as equivalent to conduct
constituting the offense of Aiding the Enemy, as historically punished under the
laws of war by military commissions.”); Appellee’s Response to the Specified
Issues at 14–15, United States v. Hamdan, CMCR Case No. 09-002 (U.S. Ct.
Military Commission Review Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Gov’t Response
(Hamdan)] (using the same language as Gov’t Response (al Bahlul) to describe the
offense of Aiding the Enemy).
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terminated and interdicted.”32 The Supreme Court regularly
embraced the logic of the rule during the Civil War, observing that:
The people of the loyal States . . . and the people of the
Confederate States . . . became enemies to each other, and
were liable to be dealt with as such without reference to
their individual opinions and dispositions. Commercial
intercourse and correspondence between them were
prohibited . . . by the accepted doctrines of public law. The
enforcement of contracts previously made between them
was suspended, partnerships were dissolved, and the
courts of each belligerent were closed to the citizens of the
other . . . .33
The rule of non-intercourse was invoked as recently as the
Korean War, when several U.S. soldiers who had provided
propaganda for their captors were prosecuted under the UCMJ’s
version of aiding the enemy, now codified at Article 104.34 The
defendants’ status as prisoners of war being held on foreign soil
was not dispositive, because in the case of citizens, the “impassable
‘line’ between belligerents is not geographic. . . . Whatever the
place, whether within or without an area controlled by the United
States, there can be no unauthorized intercourse between a citizen
of the United States and an enemy.”35 To be sure, a duty of
32 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 776–77 (footnotes omitted); see also HENRY W.
HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 357 (1861) (“[A] declaration, or recognition of war,
effects an absolute interruption and interdiction of all commercial intercourse and
dealings between the subjects of the two countries.”); Joseph Story, Additional Note
on the Principles and Practice in Prize Causes, reprinted in NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF PRIZE COURTS 28, 69 (Frederick Thomas Pratt ed., 1854) (“It is a
fundamental principle of Prize Law, that all trade with the enemy is prohibited to
all persons, whether natives, naturalised citizens, or foreigners domiciled in the
country during the time of their residence, under the penalty of confiscation.”).
33 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 164–65 (1879). Given the absence of a formal
declaration of war, Congress codified the rule with the enactment of the NonIntercourse Act, in order to give unequivocal notice of the illegality of continued
business dealings between residents of the Northern and Southern states. See
Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7, 12–13 (1875) (citing Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, § 5,
12 Stat. 255, 257 (1859–1863) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 205 (2006)).
34 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2006).
35 United States v. Dickenson, 6 C.M.A. 438, 450–51 (C.M.A. 1955); see also
United States v. Olson, 7 C.M.A. 460, 466 (C.M.A. 1957) (“Accused’s position is
not essentially different from that of American citizens interned within enemy
territory. . . . The obligation of allegiance which attaches to citizenship continues
to rest upon the shoulders of one so situated.”); United States v. Batchelor, 7

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

03 MORISON (DO NOT DELETE)

134

10/30/2011 9:37 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:1

allegiance is not an express element of the offense under Article
104, but in practice this invariably has been assumed.36 Congress
presumably agrees, moreover, because the counterpart to Article
104 in the MCA makes explicit the necessary “breach of an
allegiance or duty to the United States . . . .”37
C.M.A. 354, 368 (C.M.A. 1956) (describing aiding the enemy as “closely akin to
treason”).
36 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 584 U.S. 557, 600 n.32 (2006) (“[T]he crime of
aiding the enemy may, in circumstances where the accused owes allegiance to the
party whose enemy he is alleged to have aided, be triable by military commission
pursuant to Article 104 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 904.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 558–59 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[A] plurality of
this Court, asserts that captured enemy combatants (other than those suspected of
war crimes) have traditionally been detained until the cessation of hostilities and
then released. That is probably an accurate description of wartime practice with
respect to enemy aliens. The tradition with respect to American citizens, however,
has been quite different. Citizens aiding the enemy have been treated as traitors
subject to the criminal process.”); Olson, 7 C.M.A. at 464 (“[W]hether or not an
offense [under Article 104] has been alleged depends upon the facts alleged, and
the factual allegations are to be found in the specifications, not in the designation
of the charge or article.”). Importantly, the same principle applied in war crimes
prosecutions after the Second World War. For example, in 1948, a Nazi officer
who had served as a prison warden in the Netherlands during the war was
convicted of various law-of-war offenses and sentenced to seven years
imprisonment. See Trial of Willy Zuehlke, 14 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 139 (1949). In an effort to
secure a longer sentence, the prosecutor argued that the defendant’s crimes fell
within the terms of the Dutch penal code’s version of aiding the enemy, which
provided that whoever “in time of war intentionally lends assistance to the enemy
or prejudices the State with respect to the enemy, shall be punished with
imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years.” Id. at 141 n.1. The court rejected this
argument because “[i]f the latter were to be applied it would mean that the
defendant, being an enemy, would have ‘lent assistance’ to himself, and this was
not the type of case covered by [the statute].” Id. at 141. This was true despite the
fact that the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands was itself a criminal act of
aggression, but that did not render every subsequent act by a Nazi official within
occupied territory a war crime. Id. at 144. Thus, a Nazi official could not be
convicted of “aiding the enemy” merely for lending assistance to his own
government within territory under the occupation of the German military,
because in these circumstances he owed no duty of allegiance to the Netherlands.
37 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t(26); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF MIL. COMM’N,
Manual for Military Commissions, Part 21(26), cmt. 3 (April 27, 2010), available at
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/2010_Manual_for_Military_Commissions.pdf.
The requirement that conduct be wrongful for this crime necessitates that
the accused owe allegiance or some duty to the United States of America.
For example, citizenship, resident alien status, or a contractual
relationship in or with the United States is sufficient to satisfy this
requirement so long as the relationship existed at a time relevant to the
offense alleged.
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Accordingly, the gravamen of aiding the enemy is not merely
that support is given, but the breach of fidelity it entails, where the
obligation of allegiance attaches to those who by reason of their
citizenship or residence enjoy the reciprocal protection of the
injured State. The “obligation of fidelity and obedience which the
individual owes to the government under which he lives” is thus
assumed “in return for the protection he receives.”38 Whereas a
citizen owes “an absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government,” a resident alien owes “a local and temporary
allegiance,” which obligates him “to obey all the laws of the
country” during the period of residency “not immediately relating
to citizenship,” and makes him “equally amenable with citizens for
any infraction of those laws.”39
Although the status of the recipient of the material support as
an enemy is a necessary element of the offense, this is not sufficient
to establish a violation of the norm. Rather, the critical question is
the relationship between the putative defendant and the offended
belligerent. Simply put, providing material support to the enemies
of the United States, by itself, has never been considered a war
crime, unless the provider is under a legal obligation to refrain. It
follows that violations of the injunction against aiding the enemy
are necessarily “treasonable in their nature.”40
Id.
Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872).
Id.
40 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 629; see also JOHN O’BRIEN, A TREATISE ON
AMERICAN MILITARY LAWS, AND THE PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL: WITH
SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT 148 (Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1846)
(explaining that aiding the enemy can only apply “to those owing allegiance,
either permanently or temporarily, (as in the case of foreign occupied conquered
provinces) to the United States” but “could never be supposed to apply to an alien
enemy . . . .”); Jabez W. Loane, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30 MIL. L. REV. 43, 80
(1965) (characterizing aiding the enemy under Article 104 as “the military law of
treason”); Thomas Marmon, et al., Military Commissions 22–23 (April 1953)
(unpublished LL.M. Thesis, The Judge Advocate General's School) (on file with
The
Judge
Advocate
General's
School
Library),
available
at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/mil_commissions.pdf.
38
39

[Article 104] is a strictly national offense that can be committed in the
United States by resident aliens and at any place of contact with enemy
persons by United States citizens . . . . [N]ational treason and the
statutory offense of aiding the enemy are based on the higher duty,
although it may be one arising from temporary residence, of allegiance to
the injured state.
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Not surprisingly, both civilian and military tribunals have
consistently held that a U.S. citizen or a resident alien violates the
rule of non-intercourse if he provides material support to an
opposing belligerent by, for example, “running or attempting to
run a blockade; unauthorized contracting, trading or dealing with,
enemies, or furnishing them with money, arms, provisions, [or]
medicines.”41 Conversely, a non-resident alien commits no offense
under international law merely by providing the same sort of
material support to insurgents engaged in hostilities against the
United States, because all else equal, he is under no legal obligation
to abstain from such activities.42
Confronted with the weight of contrary authority, the
Government argues that:
[T]he offense of Aiding the Enemy has also been applied to
situations in which a person providing aid or support to an
enemy has done so in violation of some [other] duty . . . to a
sovereign, namely a duty not to provide aid or support to
an enemy waging an unlawful belligerency, or who is
Id.
41 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 839–40; see also WAR DEP’T, BUREAU OF MILITARY
JUSTICE, DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY ch. II, ¶
14, at 79 (1865) (“Because blockade-running involves a forfeiture of goods, it does
not follow that it is not triable by a military commission. It involves a criminal
responsibility also, and when engaged in by citizens of the United States, owing
allegiance to its government, it is clearly so triable.”); War Dep’t, Adjutant
General’s Office, G.C.M.O., No. 254 (1864) (approving the findings and sentence
of the military commission of J. B. Sabels, “a citizen owing allegiance to the United
States,” who was found guilty of giving “aid and comfort [to] the enemy,” by
using a blockade running vessel to deliver substantial quantities of munitions “to
enemies in arms against the United States”).
42 See Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 66 (1877) (holding that a nonresident British citizen “committed no crime against the laws of the United States
or the laws of nations” by providing material support to the Confederacy,
including arms, ammunition and money, because in the absence of a duty of
allegiance he was “not a traitor”); Green v. United States, 8 Ct. Cl. 412, 420 (1872)
(holding that “no crime can be imputed” to a non-resident alien for giving
“material aid . . . to the rebellion”); La Plante v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 311, 311
(1870) (holding that the rule of non-intercourse does not apply to non-resident
aliens); Report of Maj. L. C. Turner to Col. James A. Hardie (June 4, 1864), in THE
WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, Ser. 2, vol. 7, at 194–95 (U.S. War Dep’t ed.,
Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1899) (discussing the decision of a military
commission which held that non-resident aliens did not violate the laws of war by
serving on blockade running vessels carrying contraband to the Confederacy).
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waging a belligerency that violates the laws and customs of
war.43
Although its briefs are conspicuously silent on the source of this
purported duty, the Government does manage to locate a single
instance in which a non-resident alien was punished by an
American military tribunal for what might be fairly described as
providing material support to a party engaged in hostilities against
the United States, namely Andrew Jackson’s decision to execute
Arbuthnot and Ambrister for aiding the Seminoles Indians and
their black allies during the First Seminole War. At best, one
anomalous result is an exceedingly thin reed to support the
Government’s burden of persuasion. In any event, whether this is
a morally respectable precedent depends entirely on the facts of
the case and the quality of Jackson’s decision.
4.

“A SAVAGE NEGRO WAR”

Given the dearth of historical evidence supporting its legal
position, the Government resorts to the argument that Jackson’s
decision to execute Arbuthnot and Ambrister may serve as a
legitimate precedent for trying alien enemies on material support
charges under the MCA, even though the defendants admittedly
did not receive “a fair and impartial trial.”44 For present purposes,
the procedural irregularities that infected the underlying
proceedings are a matter of indifference, the Government suggests,
because Jackson would have been justified under the extant law of
war if he had ordered the men to be executed without affording
them any due process whatsoever. The defendants were not
entitled to such consideration, the argument goes, because by
joining in league with the functional equivalent of a terrorist
organization engaged in “unlawful hostilities” against the United
States, they had forfeited the right to be treated any better than
their “savage” associates. While recognizing that international law
no longer permits suspected terrorists to be summarily executed
after being taken into custody, the Government insists that the case
is sufficient to establish the legal principle that non-resident aliens
43 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 19; see also Gov’t Response
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 15–16.
44 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 24 n.13; see also Gov’t Response
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 18 n.39.
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“may today be the subject of war crimes charges” if they provide
material support to those engaged in an unlawful belligerency,
even in the absence of a duty of allegiance to the United States.45
Even so, the logic of this argument depends entirely upon the
assumption that the Seminoles’ mode of warfare made them the
functional equivalent of present-day terrorists. Otherwise, the
defendants’ trial and execution on the ostensible grounds that they
were guilty of aiding unlawful belligerents cannot possibly be
good law, particularly given the serious procedural defects in the
underlying proceedings, which the Government does not contest.
By its own lights, if the Seminoles weren’t actually engaged in an
unlawful belligerency, Arbuthnot and Ambrister must have been
wrongfully executed, and the case is a worthless precedent.
Hence, without citing a shred of credible historical evidence to
substantiate the charge, the Government baldly asserts that:
[N]ot only was the Seminole belligerency unlawful, but,
much like modern-day al Qaeda, the very way in which the
Seminoles waged war against U.S. targets itself violated the
customs and usages of war. Because Ambrister and
Arbuthnot aided the Seminoles both to carry on an
unlawful belligerency and to violate the laws of war, their
conduct was wrongful and punishable.46
45 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 19; see also Gov’t Response
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 15–18. The Government’s stance ignores Justice
Douglas’s admonition that it “is foreign to our thought to defend a mock hearing
on the ground that in any event it was a mere gratuity. Hearings that are
arbitrary and unfair are no hearings at all under our system of government.”
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 187 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 25; see also Gov’t Response
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 19 (arguing that the case constitutes “evidence [that]
the United States has punished conduct like Appellant’s material support for
terrorism at military commissions, even in the absence of any duty or allegiance
on the part of the accused. Consequently, Appellant’s conviction for material
support to al Qaeda is not ex post facto.”). At oral argument before the CMCR,
counsel for the Government in Hamdan reiterated the comparison, stating that
“the substance” of Arbuthnot and Ambrister’s crimes “was the savage killing of
civilians,” whereas “the goal . . . of al Qaeda is the savage killing of Americans
wherever they find them throughout the world.” Col. (Ret.) Francis Gilligan, Oral
Argument at 34:15, United States v. Hamdan, CMCR Case No. 09-002 (U.S. Ct.
Mil. Comm’n Rev. Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES
/USCourtofMilitaryCommissionReview.aspx (follow “Salim Ahmed Hamdan”
hyperlink under “Case Name”; then follow “Recording of Oral Argument”
hyperlink).
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The only “evidence” the Government presents to support this
depiction of the Seminoles is (1) Jackson’s own justification of his
order to execute the defendants, (2) several post hoc statements
issued by President Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams in an effort to quell the political fallout caused by the
controversy, and (3) the fact that Jackson’s partisan supporters in
the House of Representatives narrowly defeated the
recommendation of the Military Affairs Committee to issue an
official censure of the general’s actions.47 In particular, the
Government highlights President Monroe’s State of the Union
message to Congress in 1819, in which he reiterates the claim that
Arbuthnot and Ambrister were not entitled to any legal protections
in virtue of their association with unlawful belligerents:
Men who thus connect themselves with savage
communities, and stimulate them to war, which is always
attended, on their part, with acts of barbarity the most
shocking, deserve to be viewed in a worse light than the
savages. They would certainly have no claim to an
immunity from the punishment, which, according to the
rule of warfare practised by the savages, might justly be
inflicted on the savages themselves.48
While the Government dutifully acknowledges that “Jackson’s
actions were not without controversy,” it recites the foregoing facts
as if they are sufficient to vindicate the legitimacy of the asserted
legal principle.49 “[I]n the end,” the Government credulously
asserts, “his actions were supported by the President and Secretary
of State, and the House of Representative expressly voted down a
resolution of disapproval.”50 But this is plainly insufficient to
discharge the Government’s burden of persuasion, because the
mere fact that Jackson and his political defenders issued a series of
self-serving rationalizations for what he had done quite obviously
does not necessarily mean his actions were legally defensible. It
47 See Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 23–25; see also Gov’t
Response (Hamdan), supra note 31, at 16–18 (same).
48 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 13 (1818), quoted in Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra
note 7, at 23–24 and Gov’t Response (Hamdan), supra note 31, at 17.
49 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 25; Gov’t Response (Hamdan),
supra note 31, at 18.
50 Id.
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might just as easily mean they were trying to obfuscate Jackson’s
illegal execution of two British citizens, who were actually innocent
of any crime under the law of war.
Indeed, when viewed in context, the evidence strongly
suggests that is exactly what occurred. Over and above the
execution of two British citizens, Jackson’s decision to occupy the
Spanish garrisons at St. Marks and Pensacola without clear
justification “caught [the Monroe Administration] in a diplomatic
bind,” and the cabinet was sharply divided on the appropriate
response.51 Behind closed doors, Jackson’s only staunch defender
was the Secretary of State, who saw the dislocation caused by the
invasion as an opportunity to gain leverage in his negotiations
with Spain over the final disposition of Florida. For these
unrelated political reasons, Adams therefore urged the President to
defend the invasion as an act of preemptive self-defense and the
executions as legitimate acts of retributive justice.52
In contrast, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, with the
concurrence of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Treasury, argued that Jackson had waged an undeclared war
against a nation in amity with the United States, in violation of
Calhoun’s explicit orders.53 For that reason, they “secretly urged
[Jackson’s] censure and roundly called for an investigation.”54
In July 1818, after procrastinating for more than a month,
President Monroe ultimately decided against issuing a public
censure, largely because he “was loath to own up to his share in
Jackson’s aggression,” going so far as to suggest that several
ANDREW BURSTEIN, THE PASSIONS OF ANDREW JACKSON 131 (2003).
Adams did indeed take advantage of the situation to promptly negotiate a
treaty with his Spanish counterpart, Don Luis de Onís, “acquiring the whole of
Florida for the United States and mapping the long border between Spanish and
American possessions extending all the way to the Pacific.” Id. at 132–33; see also
Deborah A. Rosen, Wartime Prisoners and the Rule of Law: Andrew Jackson’s Military
Tribunals during the First Seminole War, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 559, 589 (2008)
(explaining senators’ unwillingness to discuss censuring Jackson’s behavior in
Florida while the Adams-Onís Transcontinental Treaty was pending, because
many Americans credited Jackson with creating the diplomatic environment in
which the treaty was negotiated).
53 See infra text accompanying notes 99–100.
54 BURSTEIN, supra note 51, at 132; see also 1 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW
JACKSON: THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1767-1821 366-67 (2d ed. 1998)
(“Calhoun [was] furious because Jackson . . . had gone over his head to Monroe
for authorization to seize Florida . . . .”).
51
52
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incriminating letters Jackson had written from the battlefield
should be doctored, supposedly in the interests of national
security.55 Although he secretly drafted a critical note that was
evidently meant to mollify the Spanish foreign minister and
promised to return Pensacola and St. Marks, the President was
reluctant to adopt a more confrontational strategy with Jackson,
because he feared that it might prove politically unpopular given
Jackson’s growing status as a cult hero.56 Moreover, as he said in a
confidential letter to Senator Rufus King, if he “disavow[ed]
[Jackson’s] measures [and brought] the General to trial,” it might
interfere with “the cession of Florida . . . . Spain must see by this
occurrence . . . that she cannot retain Florida.”57 Accordingly,
President Monroe’s decision to mount a public defense of his
conduct was hardly a matter of principle and therefore lends little
if any weight to the precedential value of the case.
Instead, by any reasonable measure, as Rep. Charles Mercer
remarked during the congressional debates over Jackson’s censure,
the trial and execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister is nothing less
than “a stain on the records of the judicial proceedings of this
nation.”58 Given that this is the only known instance of a military
55 BURSTEIN, supra note 51, at 133; REMINI, supra note 54, at 368.
After
reviewing one particularly incriminating letter, Monroe cryptically wrote in the
margin that he hoped Jackson’s “conduct will be approved, which shows, that he
had acted on his own responsibility.” DAVID S. HEIDLER & JEANNE T. HEIDLER, OLD
HICKORY’S WAR: ANDREW JACKSON AND THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE 181 (2d ed. 2003)
(quoting Letter from Andrew Jackson to James Monroe, President of the United
States, (June 2, 1818) (on file with the New York Public Library)).
56 See, e.g., REMINI, supra note 54, at 366–67.

In April and May 1818, the newspapers were filled with stories of the
capture of St. Marks and the executions of Arbuthnot and Ambrister,
which delighted a large segment of the American public. . . . Obviously
the President could not censure Jackson because . . . it might not sit well
with the American people.
Id.; David S. Heidler, The Politics of National Aggression: Congress and the First
Seminole War, 13 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 501, 507 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (“Anyone
who doubted Jackson’s popularity or challenged his power did so at high peril.
Monroe had spent a good deal of time mollifying Jackson’s prickly sensitivity
over a variety of concerns and often did so at the expense of the principle of
civilian control of the military.”).
57 Letter from James Monroe to R. King (July 22, 1818), in 6 THE LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING, 1816–1827, at 155, 156 (Charles R. King ed.,
1900).
58 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 818–19 (1819).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

03 MORISON (DO NOT DELETE)

142

10/30/2011 9:37 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:1

prosecution of a non-resident alien for conduct that resembles
providing material support to the enemy, it is important to correct
the Government’s tendentious account of the matter. Before
turning to the myriad legal infirmities that infected the court
martial proceedings, however, it is appropriate to pause for a
moment to consider the unseemly historical background of the
case.
In the judgment of historians who have studied the First
Seminole War, it is a “distortion simply to say that fugitive
Negroes and hostile Indians stirred up by unscrupulous British
subjects were making unprovoked attacks on innocent American
frontiersmen,”59 as the Monroe Administration belatedly claimed.
On the contrary, the conflict that ensnared Arbuthnot and
Ambrister was essentially a war of aggression waged by the
United States against the sovereign territory of Spain, primarily at
the instigation of American slave-holding interests. In the early
nineteenth century, what is today Florida was a largely
undeveloped frontier: “a wild borderland where Indian tribes, the
United States, Spain, and Great Britain competed fiercely for
supremacy.”60 After the War of 1812, it remained under the
nominal control of Spain, but Spanish authorities were unable to
“enforce peace on the border,” and perhaps more importantly,
“were unable to prevent black slaves from fleeing to Florida and
joining the Seminole Indians.”61
In fact, more than 1,000 black persons—including former slaves
who had escaped from captivity in the United States and their
offspring—lived peacefully among the closely-related indigenous
tribes known collectively as the Seminoles, in a series of villages in
Spanish Florida. The American plantation owners living in the
neighboring states greatly resented this development, both because
they considered the escaped slaves to be their chattel property, and
because the existence of thriving communities of people of color in
such close proximity to themselves was considered an existential
threat to their “peculiar” way of life. While the motivation for the
invasion of Florida was thus partly inspired by the desire for
59 J. Leitch Wright, Jr., A Note on the First Seminole War as Seen by the Indians,
Negroes, and Their British Advisers, 34 J. S. HIST. 565, 574 (1968).
60 John K. Mahon, The First Seminole War, November 21, 1817–May 24, 1818, 77
FLA. HIST. Q. 62, 62 (1998).
61 Id.
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territorial expansion which necessitated the forcible removal of the
indigenous inhabitants, the “principal objective was to break up
the free Negro frontier settlements which were becoming
increasingly a menace to the slave systems of adjacent states.”62 It
bears emphasizing that these were the “savage communities” to
which President Monroe was principally referring in the State of
the Union speech which the Government cites in justification of the
execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister.63
The prologue to the war occurred in July 1816, when Jackson,
under pressure from frontier citizens, ordered the destruction of
the so-called Negro Fort, which was home to more than 300 black
men, women, and children.64 The fort, its surrounding fields, and
pasture land, which extended fifty miles along the Apalachicola
River, had become “a beacon light to restless slaves for miles
around” and its mere existence was considered “an unceasing
threat to the property rights of the slave-owners along the border
and as such its abatement was demanded.”65 Although the
garrison itself was located some sixty miles within Spanish
territory, Jackson rationalized the incursion as an act of national
self-defense since as he informed the Governor of Pensacola, the
Spanish authorities had failed to, “return to our citizens . . . those
62 Kenneth Wiggins Porter, Negroes and the Seminole War, 1817–1818, 36 J.
NEGRO HIST. 249, 280 (1951). See also Heidler, supra note 56, at 504 (“Americans
interpreted [Indian land] claims as open hostility, especially when Seminoles
began providing a refuge for runaway slaves.”); Linda K. Kerber, The Abolitionist
Perception of the Indian, 62 J. AM. HIST. 271, 275 (1975) (“Because the raids had
begun as retribution for the harboring of runaway slaves, the debate also became
one on slavery and the extent to which the national government was responsible
for its protection.”); Mahon, supra note 60, at 62 (“Slaveholders considered [a
garrison of black troops substantially made up of “runaway slaves” as] renegades
and . . . a menace to their lives and property.”); Rosen, supra note 52, at 562–63
(“Jackson invaded Florida with the stated goal of stopping the ongoing border
conflict with the Indians, but with the additional underlying objectives of ousting
the Spanish from Florida and ending the territory’s role as a sanctuary for fugitive
slaves.”).
63 See supra text accompanying note 48 (quoting President Monroe’s 1819
State of the Union Address in which he referred to “savage communities”). In this
sense, the First Seminole War might fairly be characterized as the opening act in
the conflict that ultimately culminated in the Civil War.
64 See Porter, supra note 62, at 260–61 (describing the inhabitants of the
garrison at the “Negro Fort” as “[s]omething over 300 Negroes, including women
and children, together with about 20 renegade Choctaw and a few Seminole
warriors . . . .”).
65 Id. at 261.
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negroes now in [the] fort” who had been “stolen and enticed” from
“the service of their masters.”66 In his orders to General Edmund
Gaines, Jackson said that he harbored “little doubt . . . that this fort
has been established by some villains for the purpose of rapine and
plunder, and that it ought to be blown up, regardless of the ground
on which it stands.”67 “[D]estroy it,” he emphatically concluded,
“and return the stolen negroes and property to their rightful
owners.”68
Nothing could have been further from the truth. As Jackson
was well aware, the fort originally had been built by the British
Army in 1814.69 When the British pulled their forces out of Florida
the following summer, they left the garrison and its armaments in
the custody of fugitive slaves, who had been recruited with the
promise of freedom and land in exchange for their service to the
As Joshua Giddings, a prominent
British Government.70
abolitionist politician from Ohio, observed with the perspective of
forty years:
Perhaps no portion of our national history exhibits such
disregard of international law, as this unprovoked invasion
of Florida. For thirty years, the slaves of our Southern
66 See Letter from General Jackson to the Governor of Pensacola, 23 April
1816, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4:555–56 (Walter Lowrie &
Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834) (instructing Governor Zuniga, as the authority of
Spanish Florida, to take action against the Fort, or expect U.S. forces to cross the
border and destroy the settlement in order to defend U.S. citizens’ property
rights).
67 JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS, THE EXILES OF FLORIDA 37 (1858) (quoting Jackson’s
order to General Gaines).
68 Id.; see also Letter from General Jackson to the Secretary of War, 15 June
1816, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4:557 (“[T]here can be no fear of
disturbing the good understanding that exists between us and Spain, by
destroying the negro fort, and restoring to the owners the negroes that may be
captured. The 4th and 7th infantry will be sufficient to destroy it.”).
69 See, e.g., Report of Captain Amelung to General Jackson, 4 June 1816,
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4:557 (providing General Jackson
intelligence on the fort, including that it was constructed by “Nichols and
Woodbine” of the British army).
70 See Wright, supra note 59, at 569 (stating that black soldiers who served
under the British at the fort were promised freedom as well as land and that most
remained living at the fort or in nearby settlements); see also Porter, supra note 62,
at 260 (noting that after the British forces left the fort they relinquished their
armaments to refugee slaves who had been recruited by the promise of freedom at
war’s end).
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States have been in the habit of fleeing to the British
Provinces. Here they are admitted to all the rights of
citizenship, in the same manner as they were in Florida.
They vote and hold office under British laws; and when our
Government demanded that the English Ministry should
disregard the rights of these people and return them to
slavery, the British Minister contemptuously refused even
to hold correspondence with our Secretary of State on a
subject so abhorrent to every principle of national law and
self-respect. Our Government coolly submitted to the
scornful arrogance of England; but did not hesitate to
invade Florida with an armed force, and to seize faithful
subjects of Spain, and enslave them.71
Moreover, the allegation that the Black Seminole population of
Spanish Florida was a genuine military threat to the United States
was a sheer pretext for aggression. It is true, of course, that the
Seminoles and their black allies aggressively defended themselves
against the encroachments of white settlers and bounty-hunters
searching for escaped slaves. The Indians, however, ineffectually
pressed claims for the return of lands that they believed were
rightfully theirs.72 As a result, periodic outbursts of violence,
followed by the inevitable cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal,
were endemic in the Apalachicola River region.73
GIDDINGS, supra note 67, at 37 n.1.
See, e.g., Porter, supra note 62, at 255 (observing that “to the numerous free
Negroes and the runaways living among the Indians [annexation] meant the loss
of hard-won freedom”). Wright, supra note 59, at 565 (“There is no doubt . . . that
[the Seminoles] considered that part of their lands lay in the United States above
the Florida boundary, that the Americans were the aggressors, and that, rather
than making unprovoked attacks, the Indians were merely defending their
homeland.”) (footnote omitted).
73 David Mitchell was a respected former Governor of Georgia, who served
as the official U.S. envoy to the Indians in the region during this period. During
the Senate investigation into Jackson’s conduct of the war, Mitchell testified that,
in his experience:
71
72

The peace of the frontier of Georgia has always been exposed and
disturbed, more or less, by acts of violence, committed as well by the
whites as the Indians; and a spirit of retaliation has mutually prevailed . .
. . I believe the first outrage committed on the frontier of Georgia, after
the treaty of Fort Jackson, was by these [white] banditti, who plundered
a party of Seminole Indians, on their way to Georgia for the purpose of
trade, and killed one of them. This produced retaliation on the part of
the Indians.
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But the notion that the Black Seminoles were preparing to
launch a campaign of “rapine and plunder” against the white
citizenry of Georgia or Alabama was preposterous. Quite the
opposite, as one disinterested observer reported, the prospect of
facing Jackson’s army left the native population “terrified, not
hostile.”74 While it amounted to little more than thinly-veiled
racist demagoguery, the accusation nevertheless became part of the
standard repertoire of Jackson’s partisan defenders. As one ardent
congressional supporter put it, Ambrister’s execution had been
justified because he supposedly “came to Florida to command the
runaway negroes of Georgia, slaves who had absconded from their
masters, and were organized by him to return to our country, and
visit it with all the horrors of a savage negro war.”75
In any event, Jackson’s forces quite literally blew up Negro Fort
by deliberately firing a cannon ball into the fort’s ammunition
depot. Some 270 men, women, and children were killed in the
explosion and the ensuing battle. The Americans reportedly took
64 prisoners, including two men who were identified as the
resident Negro and Choctaw chiefs. In a nascent version of
extraordinary rendition, they were turned over to friendly Creek
Indians who had been recruited to fight alongside the U.S. Army.
The two men were immediately executed in retaliation for the
death of an American prisoner, although not before the Choctaw
chief was scalped alive.76
Sworn statement of D. B. Mitchell, 23 February 1819, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:748–49 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Claire Clarke eds.,
1832). See also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 79–80 (detailing David
Mitchell’s appointment as the U.S. agent to the Creek Indian tribe under President
Madison).
74 HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 123.
75 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1039 (1819). In 1830, then-President Jackson rewarded
Representative Henry Baldwin’s loyalty with an appointment to the Supreme
Court where he earned “the dubious distinction of being the first Supreme Court
Justice to expound the principle of substantive due process—to protect slaveowners against possible congressional action.” Donald M. Roper, Judicial
Unanimity and the Marshall Court—A Road to Reappraisal, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118,
131 (1965). See also Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449, 510–17 (1841) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring) (stating that for the federal scheme of government to work, slaves
must be considered nothing more than legal property).
76 See Letter from General Jackson to the Governor of Pensacola, 23 April
1816, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4:555 (urging that the “negro
fort” needed to be subdued because it posed a threat to peaceful diplomatic
relations between the United States and Spain); GIDDINGS, supra note 67, at 41–42
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The few remaining prisoners who survived their wounds were
returned to Georgia and sold into slavery, thereby fulfilling
Jackson’s charge. In most cases, it was impossible to establish who
had a valid claim of ownership to these persons, considering there
was no reliable “proof of identity, nor was there any court
authorized to take testimony, or enter decree in such case.”77 In
order to clear any cloud over the title, the survivors “were
delivered over upon claim, taken to the interior, and sold to
different planters” where they were “swallowed up” in the mass of
African-Americans being held in slavery.78
The atrocity at Negro Fort effectively ended the presence of
free blacks in the Apalachicola River region, with approximately
one-third of the entire population living in Spanish Florida having
been either killed or enslaved. The survivors of the Negro Fort
settlement who managed to escape the massacre fled east to the
Suwanee River. There, they found refuge with another branch of
the Seminole moieties living under the protection of Chief
Bowlegs.79 In early 1817, Alexander Arbuthnot, a seventy year-old
Scottish merchant, arrived at the Seminole settlement on the
Suwanee in his schooner Chance. Having obtained a license from
the Spanish governor of Cuba, Arbuthnot had loaded his vessel
with merchandise and set off for Indian country with the intention
of establishing a trading-house.80 Although he was undoubtedly a
shrewd businessman in search of profits, he also took a genuine
interest in the welfare of the Seminoles. As such, he “frequently
wrote on . . . Bowlegs’s behalf to American officers and officials,”
(describing the massacre at the fort and the execution of the Negro and Choctaw
chiefs); Porter, supra note 62, at 264 (stating that the Negro and Choctaw chiefs
were executed in retaliation for an American prisoner’s death). In exchange for
assisting in the attack, the Creeks were promised booty seized at Negro Fort, as
well as a bounty of $50 for each American-owned slave they captured. KENNETH
W. PORTER, THE BLACK SEMINOLES: HISTORY OF A FREEDOM-SEEKING PEOPLE 17
(Alcione M. Amos & Thomas P. Senter eds., 1996).
77 GIDDINGS, supra note 67, at 42.
78 Id.
79 See Porter, supra note 62, at 264–65 (explaining that those who were able to
escape the massacre at the Negro Fort settlement fled to Bowlegs’s villages on the
Suwanee).
80 See id. at 266 (detailing Arbuthnot’s 1817 arrival to Suwanee in order to
establish a trading-house); Wright, supra note 59, at 573 (noting that by 1817,
Arbuthnot had established stores along the Suwanee river with the approval of
the Spanish governor of Cuba).
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urging the return of territory which they felt had been taken by the
United States in violation of its treaty obligations. Arbuthnot’s
letters “were later remembered and held against him.”81
Several months later, Arbuthnot’s schooner returned to the
Suwanee settlement from a trip to the West Indies with a number
of white passengers. Among them was a young Robert Ambrister,
who had recently lost his commission in the British Royal Marines
reportedly for engaging in an illegal duel, the scion of a prominent
Bahamian family.82 In need of employment, Ambrister had
accepted the invitation of his former captain, George Woodbine,
who had trained pro-British Indians and fugitive slaves to fight the
Americans in a previous conflict, to return to Florida.83 Now
soldiers of fortune, the purpose of their mission was frankly
paramilitary; namely, to “work[] with Indians and blacks to drive
the Spanish out of Florida.”84
Although Woodbine soon left, Ambrister decided to remain.
According to the testimony at his court martial, he reportedly said
that he intended “to see the Negroes righted” and encouraged
them not to retreat before the advancing Americans “for, if they
ran any further [sic], they would be driven into the sea.”85 Given
his military experience, he thus took over the task of “drilling . . .
the Negro warriors” as well as acting as a counselor to Chief
Bowlegs.86 It was for these actions, rather than any actual war

81 Porter, supra note 62, at 266–67. See Rosen, supra note 52, at 561 (“In
Florida, Arbuthnot served as an advocate for the restoration of Creek lands in
Alabama and Georgia, which they had ceded to the United States.”).
82 See HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 151–52 (summarizing Ambrister’s
Bahamian heritage and the rumor that he lost his commission with the British
Royal Marines due to an illegal duel); PORTER, supra note 76, at 18 (identifying the
two white men Arbuthnot returned from the West Indies with as British Captain
Woodbine and Robert C. Ambrister). Ambrister’s father was a successful
merchant and the Secretary of the Bahamian legislature, while his uncle was the
Provincial Governor.
See Frank L. Owsley, Jr., Ambrister and Arbuthnot:
Adventurers or Martyrs for British Honor, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 289, 299, 305 (1985)
(providing background on Arbuthnot and Ambrister’s executions).
83 See Owsley, supra note 82, at 296–98 (detailing Woodbine’s history as a
British agent and recruiter of pro-British Indians and slaves in Florida).
84 Rosen, supra note 52, at 562; see also Owsley, supra note 82, at 305
(“Although Jackson was certain that Ambrister’s expedition was aimed at the
United States, it was in fact directed at the Spanish in Florida.”).
85 28 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:732.
86 Porter, supra note 62, at 267.
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crimes, that Arbuthnot and Ambrister would incur the wrath of
Old Hickory.
Meanwhile, the Fort Negro massacre dramatically ratcheted up
the level of tension between the parties, making the outbreak of
further violence almost inevitable. Lest there be any doubt about
the Americans’ motives, in August 1817, General Gaines sent a
letter to Kenhadjo, the chief of the largest of the Seminole bands,
whose settlement stretched for several miles on the shore of Lake
Miccosukee, near present-day Tallahassee.87 After complaining
that the Seminoles were “bad people” who had “murdered many
of my people, and stolen my cattle and many good horses,”88
Gaines finally got to the point of his missive: “You harbor a great
many of my black people among you at Sahwahnee,” he wrote,
“[i]f you give me leave to go by you against them, I shall not hurt
any thing belonging to you.”89 In response, the chief curtly rejected
this “olive branch”:
You charge me with killing your people, stealing your
cattle, and burning your houses; it is I that have cause to
complain of the Americans . . . . I harbor no negros. When
the Englishmen were at war with America, some took
shelter among them; and it is for you white people to settle
those things among yourselves . . . . I shall use force to stop
any armed Americans from passing my towns or my
lands.90
As Kenneth Porter has observed: “[a] U.S. general had
demanded, from a Seminole chief, the right to go slave hunting in
Spanish territory and been refused.
Kenhadjo, previously
uninvolved in the hostilities surrounding him, was now an
enemy.”91 As they would soon learn, the Miccosukee band would
pay a heavy price for their chief’s defiance.
87 See id. (describing the letter that General Gaines sent Chief Kenhadjo on
August 1817); see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 39, 99 (detailing the
content of the letter General Gaines sent to Kenhadjo in August of 1817).
88 Letter from General Gaines to the Seminole Chief, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:723.
89 Id.
90 Letter from King Hatchy to General Gaines, In Answer to the Foregoing,
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:723.
91 PORTER, supra note 76, at 19; see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 99–
100.
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The immediate casus belli was a bloody incident that occurred
at Fowltown, a small Seminole village, which had been a persistent
source of tension because it sat on land claimed by white settlers
under the Treaty of Fort Jackson, on the Flint River just north of the
Florida border.92 In November 1817, a detachment of U.S. soldiers
from nearby Fort Scott crossed the river to the Seminole side to
gather wood. In response, the chief of Fowltown, Neamathla,
informed General Gaines in no uncertain terms “not to cross or cut
a stick of wood on the east side of Flint River, alleging that the land
was his . . . [and] that he was directed . . . to protect and defend it,
and should do so.”93
Such a challenge would prove “irresistible to an American
frontier commander,” and Gaines demanded a meeting with
Neamathla to resolve the matter.94 The chief refused the general’s
invitation, and Gaines promptly sent a detachment of 250 soldiers
to retrieve him and his warriors, albeit with instructions that “in
the event of resistance . . . treat them as enemies.”95 Inevitably, in
defense of their village, the Seminoles fired on the approaching
troops, who proceeded to kill an unknown number of warriors,
drive the survivors into the swamps, and then plunder the village
and burn it to the ground. As Gaines explained the incident in a
report to his superiors, he claimed he was a reasonable and peaceloving man, but “[t]he poisonous cup of barbarism cannot be taken
from the lips of the savage by the mild voice of reason alone; the
strong mandate of justice must be resorted to and enforced.”96

92 See PORTER, supra note 76, at 19 (attributing the outbreak of the First
Seminole War to the clash at Fowltown); see also REMINI, supra note 54, at 345
(noting that the Seminoles “did not want war” with the U.S. at the time).
93 Extract of a Letter from General Gaines to Major General Andrew Jackson,
21 November 1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:686.
94 REMINI, supra note 54, at 346; see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at
100 (explaining that Fowlton would be an “easy” target for the U.S. Army and
that General Gaines had concluded that “the only recourse [against the Indians
there] was force”).
95 Extract of a Letter from General Gaines to Major General Andrew Jackson,
21 November 1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:686; see also
HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 104 (explaining that after Neumathla
declined General Gaines’s invitation to meet, Gaines mobilized 250 men to
Fowlton).
96 Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War, 4 December
1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:688.
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It is generally agreed that the First Seminole War began in
earnest with the unprovoked destruction of Fowltown.97 The
Seminoles wasted no time in exacting revenge. Nine days later, a
large open boat was slowly moving up the Apalachicola River
toward Fort Scott carrying forty soldiers, most of whom were sick,
as well as seven women and four children. Lying in wait, the
Seminoles ambushed the boat when it drifted close to the shoreline
and killed everyone on board with the exception of one woman
who was taken hostage and four soldiers who managed to
escape.98 On December 16, after news of the bloodbath reached
Washington, D.C., Calhoun authorized Gaines to “consider
[him]self at liberty to march across the Florida line and to attack
[the Seminoles] within its limits, should it be found necessary,
unless they should shelter themselves under a Spanish post. In the
last event, [he was to] immediately notify [the War] Department.”99
Ten days later, Calhoun ordered Jackson to take over command of
the campaign at Fort Scott and “to adopt the necessary measures to
terminate [the] conflict” with the Seminoles.100
When the ground invasion began the following spring,
Jackson’s principal targets were the Black Seminole villages on the
Suwanee River. But other than a few skirmishes along the way, his
army of some 3,300 men encountered remarkably little armed
97 According to David Mitchell, “General Gaines . . . sent for the chief of
Fowltown, and for his contumacy in not immediately appearing before [sic] him,
the town was attacked and destroyed by the [sic] troops of the United States, by
order of General Gaines. This fact was, I conceive, the immediate cause of the
Seminole war.” No. 16, 23 February 1819, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY
AFFAIRS 1:749.
98 See HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 105, 107 (describing the passengers
and the ensuing ambush); Porter, supra note 62, at 268–69 (detailing the Indians’
and Negros’ ambush and slaughter of U.S. troops, women, and children on board
a boat traveling up the Apalachicola river); see also REMINI, supra note 54, at 346.
99 Letter of J.C. Calhoun, 16 December 1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:689.
100 Letter of J.C. Calhoun, 26 December 1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:690. The newly-minted Secretary of War assumed, naively
perhaps, that his instructions to Jackson did not rescind the previous limitation on
taking possession of Spanish territory without prior Department approval.
Although well aware of Gaines’s orders, Jackson was determined to seize Florida
anyway, and made his intentions clear in a letter to President Monroe several
weeks later, to which the President never responded. 4 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW
JACKSON 1816–1820, 166–67 (Harold D. Moser et al. eds., 1994); see also HEIDLER &
HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 117–21 (discussing the history and implication of
“Calhoun’s 26 Decemeber 1817 order to Jackson”).
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resistance, which arguably undermines any claim that the offensive
had been justified as an act of preemptive self-defense. On April 1,
Jackson’s campaign began by destroying the Miccosukee
settlement, apparently in retaliation for Kenhadjo’s refusal to
permit the Americans to traverse his territory in search of fugitive
slaves. During the battle, one American soldier was killed and
several were wounded. Although definitive casualty figures for
the Seminoles are not known, Jackson reported to his superiors
with apparent satisfaction “that his forces had burned 300 houses
and made off with ample corn and cattle.”101
A week later, he notified the Spanish commander of St. Marks
with some rhetorical license that he had been ordered by the
President to “chastise a savage foe who combined with a lawless
band of Negro brigands, have for some time past been carrying on
a cruel and unprovoked war against the citizens of the United
States . . . . [T]he next day, he occupied St. Marks without a
fight.”102 The next day, he occupied St. Marks without resistance.
There were no Negro “brigands” or Indian “savages” anywhere in
sight, but Jackson did find Arbuthnot huddled in the Governor’s
quarters and captured him.103 His men also managed to capture
two Seminole chieftains, Imala Micco and Prophet Francis, who
had been lured aboard an American naval vessel in the harbor that
was falsely flying a British flag. While the white European was
afforded the courtesy of a trial before being executed, Jackson
spitefully ordered the Indians to be “hung without trial, and with
little ceremony.”104

101

Mahon, supra note 60, at 65. As David and Jeanne Heidler point out, the:

Miccosukee Seminoles did not want war, and they sent talks to Gaines
stating it. They only wanted whites to stop stealing their cattle and
killing their people . . . . The headmen were old men, tired of running
and wary of fighting, fearful of losing everything and destroying their
people.
HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 99. The Miccosukee settlement thus does not
appear to have been a legitimate military target.
102 Mahon, supra note 60, at 65.
103 See Owsley, supra note 82, at 293–94 (noting that Arbuthnot was captured
inside the governor’s quarters at St. Marks).
104 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 261 (1819). See also Porter, supra note 62, at 270
(stating that “Jackson had the chiefs summarily hanged”); Mahon, supra note 60,
at 65–66 (noting that the Indians captured were executed without a trial while
Arbuthnot was court-martialed).
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The irony is that earlier in the conflict, warriors under the
leadership of Prophet Francis had captured Duncan McKrimmon,
a young soldier in the Georgia militia, and condemned him to
death in reprisal for the Americans’ killing of Indian civilians.
While they were preparing to carry out the execution, the chief’s
oldest daughter, Milly, interceded for the terrified soldier’s life,
apparently out of a sheer sense of compassion. The warriors
relented with the chief’s blessing, and not only didn’t kill the man,
but eventually ransomed him to the Spaniards for several gallons
of rum. After the war, McKrimmon was so grateful to Milly for
saving his life that he brought her a modest gift of money he had
collected from the citizens of his home town and offered to marry
her, although she politely declined.105 Savagery, it seems, is in the
eye of the beholder.106
Jackson then turned his attention to Bowleg’s Town, the largest
of the settlements under the leadership of Chief Bowlegs, which
was about 100 miles away on the Suwanee River. He reached the
town on April 16, where after a brief engagement, the majority of
the Seminoles and black settlers broke into small groups and
disappeared into the woods. Frustrated at his inability to engage
the enemy, Jackson ordered the town to be looted and destroyed;
his forces suffered no causalities.107 While Jackson’s men were
busy plundering the town for food and cattle, Ambrister
105 See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1819) (summarizing Milly’s intervention on
behalf of the condemned McKrimmon to save him from execution); HEIDLER &
HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 138–39 (chronicling the history and meeting between
McKrimmon and Milly); T. Frederick Davis, Milly Francis and Duncan McKrimmon:
An Authentic Florida Pocahontas, 21 FLA. HIST. Q. 254, 256–60 (1943) (detailing
Milly’s intervention to prevent the execution of McKrimmon, as well as his
subsequent gift of gratitude and offer of marriage).
106 The story of McKrimmon’s reprieve was recounted by Representative
Henry Storrs during the debate over Jackson’s censure. To his credit, Storrs
included Jackson’s execution of the Indians in his indictment of the general’s
actions. “We profess to be the only free Government on earth[,]” Storrs said in his
floor speech, “that our intercourse with foreign nations is characterized by
moderation and justice . . . that our national character is beyond reproach . . . . Let
our vote, on this occasion, wash out the stains which have tarnished our
reputation by the execution of the Indian chiefs and the death of Arbuthnot and
Ambrister. If, however, these deeds of cruelty are to receive the sanction of this
House, here, before God and man, I wash my hands of their blood.” 33 ANNALS
OF CONG. 753–54 (1819).
107 See Mahon, supra note 60, at 65–66 (describing Jackson’s assault on
Bowlegs Town); see also Porter, supra note 62, at 273–75 (pointing out that in the
destruction of Bowlegs Town, Jackson’s men suffered no casualties).
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“blundered into the camp at midnight on [his] way back to
Suwanee, not having heard of its capture” and was promptly taken
into custody.108
5.

THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF
ARBUTHNOT AND AMBRISTER

Although Jackson’s troops would go on to occupy Pensacola,
again without firing a shot in anger, the active phase of military
operations in the First Seminole War was at an end. Jackson
returned to St. Marks with Ambrister in tow, and informed
Calhoun that he would be leaving for his home in Tennessee since
his continued “presence in this country can be no longer
necessary.”109 But first he had to take care of some unfinished
business. On April 26, he convened what was styled a “special
court-martial” comprised of a panel of 12 Army officers, with
General Gaines serving as the presiding officer, to hear the charges
and specifications against the defendants.
The outcome was largely a foregone conclusion. As Jackson
had informed Calhoun when Arbuthnot was apprehended several
weeks earlier, the elderly Scot was “suspected as an instigator of
this savage war” and would be held “in confinement, until
evidences of his guilt can be collected.”110 When a cache of his
letters was found on board his schooner, Jackson had all the
evidence he needed, even if their contents did not logically support
the theory that Arbuthnot deliberately incited the Seminoles to
engage in an unlawful belligerency.111 Not wanting to leave

108 Porter, supra note 62, at 276; see also Owsley, supra note 82, at 303
(describing the circumstances of Ambrister’s arrest by Jackson’s forces).
109 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 261 (1819); see also REMINI, supra note 54, at 356–57
(“As far as [Jackson] could tell the war against the Seminoles was over. No
appreciable hostile force appeared to do battle. Indians simply vanished . . .
whenever he appeared. Obviously they could not wage war and probably had
never been prepared for one in the first place.”).
110 Letter from General Jackson to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, 8 April
1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:699–700.
111 The Seminoles’ strategic decision to retreat at Suwanee was informed by
Arbuthnot’s warning that resistance to Jackson’s forces would be futile. On April
2, 1818, word of Jackson’s invasion had reached Arbuthnot at St. Marks, and he
immediately wrote a letter to his son. See Letter from A. Arbuthnot to his son,
John Arbuthnot, 2 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:722.
“The main drift of the Americans,” he pointed out, “is to destroy the black
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anything to chance, five of the members Jackson chose to serve on
the panel “were Volunteer officers whom [he] had personally
recruited for the campaign.”112 The proceedings then moved with
breathtaking alacrity; over the course of the next seventy-two hours,
the defendants were formally charged, tried, convicted, and
executed.113
The only glitch occurred with respect to the sentence given to
Ambrister, who chose to throw himself on the mercy of the court
rather than contest the validity of the charges. The panel had
initially sentenced both men to death but, upon reconsideration,
reduced Ambrister’s sentence to fifty lashes and one year’s
confinement at hard labor, whereupon “the court adjourned sine
die.”114 Never a stickler for legal formalities, Jackson was not
inclined to let a mere verdict stand in the way of exacting
vengeance. As such, he presumed as the convening authority to
approve the findings and sentence with respect to Arbuthnot, but
“disapprove[d] the reconsideration of the sentence” given to

population of Suwany. Tell my friend Bowleck that it is throwing away his
people to attempt to resist such a powerful force . . . .” Id. While this letter was
introduced by the prosecution in an unsuccessful attempt to prove that Arbuthnot
was guilty of being a spy, it plainly undermines the notion he instigated the
Indians to engage in hostilities, lawful or otherwise, against the United States. As
Arbuthnot said in his closing argument, “[n]othing . . . of an inflammatory nature
can be found on reading the document . . . authorizing the opinion that I was
prompting the Indians to war.” See Defence (K.) of A. Arbuthnot, 26 April 1818,
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:730. If anything, he did precisely the
opposite. Given the illogic of the charge, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
Jackson’s animosity toward Arbuthnot was motivated, at least in part, by his
belief that Arbuthnot’s warning had deprived him of the opportunity to inflict
greater casualties at Suwanee. See REMINI, supra note 54, at 356 (noting Jackson’s
intention to execute Arbuthnot and Ambrister after discovering that the two men
warned the Seminoles when Jackson’s army was approaching); see also Letter from
General Jackson to Governor of Pensacola Don Jose Masot, 23 May 1818,
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:712–13 (providing an account of the
battle for Suwanee and the limited number of casualties inflicted by Jackson’s
army).
112 HEIDLER &HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 153.
113 See, e.g., Robert Butler, Adjutant General, Head-Quarters Division of the
South, General Orders, 29 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS
1:734 (promulgating order of Maj. Gen. Jackson approving the conviction and
death sentence of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, respectively, following “a special
court-martial, commenced on the 26th instant at St. Marks, and continued until
the night of the 28th”).
114 Id.
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Ambrister and reimposed the death penalty.115 Shortly thereafter,
Arbuthnot was hanged from the yardarm of his schooner, while
Ambrister was given the military honor of being shot by a firing
squad.116
Perhaps not surprisingly, the proceedings were infected with
significant jurisdictional and procedural errors. In particular, both
men were convicted of “aiding, abetting, and comforting the
enemy” and “supplying them with the means of war,” while being
“subject[s] of Great Britain.”117 In addition, Arbuthnot was
convicted of “[e]xciting and stirring up the Creek Indians to war
against the United States,” whereas Ambrister was convicted of
“[l]eading and commanding the Lower Creek Indians in carrying
on a war against the United States.”118
Unlike Ambrister, Arbuthnot requested the appointment of
counsel and mounted a vigorous defense on the merits. Except for
a series of letters which showed that he had repeatedly advocated
for the Seminoles’ treaty rights and attempted to dissuade them
from engaging in an armed conflict that they were certain to lose,119
the evidence against Arbuthnot consisted almost entirely of
hearsay that conspicuously tracked the prosecution’s theory of the
Id.
See Rosen, supra note 52, at 563 (describing the circumstances surrounding
Ambrister and Arbuthnot’s executions); see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55,
at 156 (same).
117 Robert Butler, Adjutant General, Head-Quarters Division of the South,
General Orders, 29 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:734.
118 Id.
119 In addition to the letter advising Bowlegs that armed resistance to
Jackson’s forces was futile, the prosecution introduced into evidence a letter from
Arbuthnot to David Mitchell, in which he wrote that:
115
116

In taking this liberty of addressing you . . . in behalf of the unfortunate
Indians, believe me I have no wish but to see an end put to a war, which,
if persisted in, I foresee must eventually be their ruin; and as they were
not the aggressors, if, in the height of their rage, they commit excesses,
that you will overlook them as the just ebullitions of an indignant spirit
against an invading foe.
Extract from Letter written by A. Arbuthnot to General Mitchell, 19 January 1818,
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:729. Not to belabor the obvious, but
while this letter clearly constitutes evidence that Arbuthnot advocated on behalf
of the Seminoles in an attempt to resolve an ongoing conflict in which, as he
rightly says, “they were not the aggressors,” it can hardly be construed as
evincing his intention to incite them to engage in unlawful belligerency against
the United States. Id.
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case. The chief witness against him was William Hambly, an
employee of a rival trading company, who bitterly resented
Arbuthnot’s competition.120 Hambly testified, over Arbuthnot’s
objection, that he had been “told by chiefs and Indians . . . that
[Arbuthnot] advised them to go to war with the United States, if
they did not surrender them the lands which had been taken from
them, and that the British government would support them in
it.”121 He was also permitted to testify that, in his opinion, the
Seminoles would not have “commenced the business of murder
and depredation on the white settlements” but for Arbuthnot’s
alleged assurances that they would receive “British protection.”122
Other than Hambly, the most important prosecution witness
was Peter Cook, a disgruntled former employee of Arbuthnot’s
trading house, whose previous employer had fired him after

120 See Owsley, supra note 82, at 295, 303–04 (arguing that Hambly’s
association with the Forbes company rendered suspect the credibility of his
testimony against Arbuthnot); see also Rosen, supra note 52, at 568 (discussing how
those who disagreed with the trial’s outcome denounced Hambly’s and Cook’s
testimony as unreliable given “their bias against Arbuthnot”).
121 Testimony of William Hambly, 27 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:729.
122 Id. In another of the cruel ironies in this case, Hambly had collaborated
with the Americans in the destruction of Negro Fort, acting “as a guide to point
out the location of the fort’s magazines.” Owsley, supra note 82, at 293; see also
HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 72 (chronicling how Hambly led American
forces to the Negro Fort); Petition of the chiefs of the Lower Creek nation to
Governor Cameron, 27 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS
1:728 (discussing Hambly’s “instrumental” role in the destruction of the fort); The
humble representations of the chiefs of the Creek nation to his excellency
Governor Cameron, 27 January 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS
1:723 (identifying Hambly as left “in charge of the fort at Prospect Bluff”).
Hambly also acted as a middleman in the transactions that sold fugitive slaves
captured at the fort back into slavery. PORTER, supra note 76, at 20. From the
Seminoles’ perspective, Hambly was further implicated in the attack on Fowltown
because he had sold supplies to the American soldiers who destroyed the village.
HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 112. In December 1817, warriors from
Fowltown captured Hambly and a colleague, and brought them to Bowleg’s
Town where they were put on trial for their complicity in the Fort Negro
massacre. PORTER, supra note 76, at 20. Although “[m]any suggested that they
should be turned over to the few Choctaw survivors of the catastrophe for
punishment[,]” the Black Seminole chief intervened and got them off “to St.
Mark’s, where [they were kept in] ‘protective custody.’” PORTER, supra note 76, at
20. Thus, Hambly survived to testify against Arbuthnot only because a Black
Seminole leader exercised his discretion to spare Hambly from an almost certain
death sentence.
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accusing him of theft.123 To be sure, the evidence showed that
Arbuthnot had sold a sizable quantity of gunpowder and
ammunition to the Seminoles at Bowleg’s Town. But as Arbuthnot
pointed out in closing, the material was not sufficient to sustain a
large fighting force for more than a short period, and had been sold
to the Seminoles in the course of his regular business for hunting
purposes, which was their primary source of food.124 In order to
counter this innocent explanation, Cook was permitted to testify
that, while he had never actually seen any weapons cache, he
allegedly “was told by Bowlegs that he had a great quantity” of
ammunition that was being kept in reserve “to fight with.”125
In addition, the prosecution introduced a letter from Arbuthnot
to Charles Bagot, the British Minister to the United States, bringing
to his attention “the deplorable situation in which [the Seminoles]
are placed by the wanton aggressions of the Americans . . . .”126
The back of the letter contained an incriminating note, which
appeared to be an inventory of arms and ammunition needed by
Kenhadjo, Bowlegs, Prophet Francis, and others for the purpose of
“attacking those Americans who have made inroads on their
territory.”127 However, “[t]his note was never identified as having
been written by Arbuthnot.”128
Over and above these sorts of evidentiary deficiencies, it was
clear to all but the most partisan observers that the tribunal lacked
jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the proceedings and the
defendants. In the first place, under the existing Articles of War,
none of the charges against the men stated a statutorily authorized
123 See Owsley, supra note 82, at 295 (arguing that given Cook’s history, he
“could [not] have been considered a reliable witness”); see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER,
supra note 55, at 154–55 (asserting that the panel never questioned Cook’s integrity
despite his dubious past).
124 See, e.g., Defence (K.) of A. Arbuthnot, 26 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:730–31 (contending the amount of gunpowder sold to
the Seminoles would not have “lasted more than two months for hunting”).
125 Testimony of Peter B. Cook, 26 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:728.
126 Letter from A. Arbuthnot to the Honorable Charles Bagot, 27 January
1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:723.
127 Id.
128 Owsley, supra note 82, at 295.
Although there was no evidence that
Arbuthnot wrote the note, it would not have been a violation of the law of war for
a non-resident alien to sell weapons to insurgents engaged in hostilities against
the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 146–51.
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offense, with the exception of spying, of which Arbuthnot had
been acquitted.129 As Speaker Henry Clay noted, Arbuthnot’s
actions, in particular, were not wrongful in any event, because they
merely:
consisted in his trading, without the limits of the United
States, with the Seminole Indians, in the accustomed
commodities which form the subject of the Indian trade;
and that he sought to ingratiate himself with his customers
by espousing their interests, in regard to the provision of
the Treaty of Ghent, which he may honestly have believed
entitled them to the restoration of their lands.130
Moreover, as Rep. Charles Mercer pointed out, “[i]n th[e]
enumeration of persons subject to the cognizance of an American
court martial, a search will be made in vain for a description
corresponding with Arbuthnot and Ambrister, after the former had
been acquitted of being a spy.”131 On the contrary, the charges
against them alleged, at best, municipal offenses, which could not
129 See Defence (K.) of A. Arbuthnot, 26 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:730 (illustrating how the defendant was not found guilty of
“acting as a spy”); Defense (M.) of Robert Christy Ambrister, 28 April 1818,
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:734 (stating the charges brought
against Ambrister). See generally Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for the
Government of the Armies of the United States, 2 Stat. 359 (1806) (setting forth the
regulations by which the armies of the United States were to be governed).
130 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 641 (1819).

Their case was not within the jurisdiction of a court martial. Courts
martial, among us, are but the mere creatures of positive law. All their
authority is derived from the statute which creates them . . . . They can
take cognizance of no offences whatever, except those specifically named
in the statute.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 752 (statement of Henry Storrs).
Admit the truth of the facts contained in these charges, are they declared
penal in any part of the rules and articles of war? Or are they therein
declared to be proper subject matters for trial before a court martial? If
they were not, it follow[s] . . . that [Jackson] . . . transcended his powers
in ordering the court, and that the court itself had stretched its powers to
an unwarrantable length, in acting upon matters not cognizable before
them.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 584–85 (statement of Thomas Cobb).
131 See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 817 (1819) (“Even where a particular offence is
cognizable by a court martial, the character ‘of the person determines whether it
may be tried by a civil or military tribunal.’”(quoting ALEXANDER MACOMB, A
TREATISE ON MARTIAL LAW AND COURTS MARTIAL 19 (1809)).
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properly reach foreign nationals who owed no duty of allegiance to
the United States. As Rep. Philip Reed explained:
These offenses can only apply . . . to our own citizens or
others within the limits or the territories of the United
States, who may engage in . . . unlawful acts against the
public authority. The law provides for offences of this sort
[conspiracies, confederacies, and combinations], but it
cannot apply to persons out of the limits of the United
States, owing no obligations or allegiance to the United
States.132
Jackson’s supporters in Congress certainly made an effort to
justify his actions by claiming that he could have executed the men
without any due process, and that the tribunal should be construed
as merely an advisory “council of war,” which Jackson was free to
disregard in his discretion. The Government strikes a similar pose
of uncertainty, stating, “it is not even clear at this juncture whether
the military tribunal which tried them was a court martial or a
military commission.”133 But aside from the fact that the concept of
a military commission as we currently know it was invented by
Major General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War in 1847,134
this sort of equivocation is a fairly desperate dodge, because no
one doubted that the proceedings were considered a court martial
until it became clear, in hindsight, that his actions were legally
indefensible under that rubric.
After all, Jackson’s own order affirming the convictions had
denominated the tribunal a “special court-martial.”135 Moreover,
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1069 (1819).
Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 25–26; Gov’t Response
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 18.
134 See WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 822–23, 832 (describing the U.S. occupation
of Mexico during the Mexican War and Major General Scott’s institution of
martial law and military commissions); see also David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The
Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 31–40 (2005) (same).
135 Robert Butler, Adjutant General, Head-Quarters Division of the South,
General Orders, 29 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:734;
see also 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 645–46 (1819) (arguing that Jackson “evidently
intended to proceed under the rules and articles of war” and that the tribunal
“understood itself to be acting as a court martial”); id. at 815–17, 1086 (arguing
that the tribunal bore the traditional indicia of a court martial); id. at 891–92
(arguing that the tribunal “was a court martial, and was so considered by the
General who ordered it, and the officers who sat upon it”); id. at 1067
132
133
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several days after the executions, in a revealing self-congratulatory
letter to Calhoun, Jackson did not intimate that the proceedings
had been anything other than an ordinary exercise of military
justice. In typically florid terms, he explained that Arbuthnot and
Ambrister had been:
tried under my orders by a special court of select officers,
legally convicted as exciters of this savage and negro war,
legally condemned, and most justly punished for their
iniquities. The proceedings of the court martial in this case,
with the volume of testimony justifying their
condemnation, present scenes of wickedness, corruption,
and barbarity, at which the heart sickens . . . .136
Two years later, after the congressional debates had revealed
the poverty of that position, Jackson adopted the view of his
supporters, namely that the tribunal had never been intended to be
a court martial. “In organizing the court of inquiry,” he wrote in
his response to the report of the Senate Military Affairs Committee,
“it was only intended (as in councils of war) that the opinion [of
the panel members] should operate directory, and as advice, not to
become binding.”137 As a result, the most serious charge against
him, the decision to order Ambrister’s execution despite the
contrary verdict of the panel members, had been entirely
appropriate. “Besides, Ambrister was the most criminal,” Jackson
added, because he had the temerity to have “commanded, in
person, a corps of negroes, with the view of anticipating [his]
occupation of St. Marks . . . .”138
(characterizing the tribunal as “to all intents and purposes, a general court
martial”).
136 Letter from Major General Andrew Jackson to Secretary of War J.C.
Calhoun, 5 May 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:702. The
Government suggests that there is some legitimate doubt as to whether the
tribunal was a court martial by citing William Birkhimer’s treatise on military law.
Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 26 n.15; Gov’t Response (Hamdan),
supra note 31, at 18 n.41. But Birkhimer’s analysis is suspect, because he simply
adopts in toto the revisionist Jacksonian view, which ignores the contemporaneous
designation that Jackson himself used to describe the tribunal.
137 Memorial of Andrew Jackson to the United States Senate, 23 February
1820, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:758.
138 Id. Of course, if this is true, one wonders why the panel bothered to
render its decision in the form of a verdict, as opposed to issuing a set of factual
findings. Under the extant Articles of War, a “court of inquiry” was limited to a
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Indeed, it is highly instructive that Jackson’s supporters made
no serious attempt to defend his actions as a legitimate assertion of
court martial jurisdiction, perhaps because the charge sheets
conspicuously omitted any reference to the existing Articles of
War. Nevertheless, at least two provisions of the code might have
been logical candidates. Articles 45 and 46 (now codified as Article
104) prohibited anyone (“whosoever”) from “reliev[ing] the enemy
with money, victuals, or ammunition” and “hold[ing]
correspondence with, or giv[ing] intelligence to, the enemy.”139
Yet, it apparently never occurred to Jackson’s supporters to argue
that Arbuthnot and Ambrister’s actions had violated these
statutory provisions, although the allegations might easily have
been couched in those terms. The obvious reason, as already
noted, is that “[t]he offenses . . . which are the subject of these two
Articles” were commonly understood to be “treasonable in their
nature,” which necessarily presupposes that they cannot be
committed by foreign nationals owing no duty of allegiance to the
United States.140
Instead, Jackson’s allies in Congress typically avoided “offering
a systematic legal argument for excluding Arbuthnot and
Ambrister from the protections of the law,” but rather “were
content to aver that no law at all protected the two men because
they themselves had acted illegally, without being explicit about
maximum of three commissioned officers, whose function was “to reduce the
proceedings and evidence to writing,” but were generally not permitted to “give
their opinion on the merits of the case . . . .” Act for Establishing Rules and
Articles for the Gov’t of Armies of the U.S., art. 91, 2 Stat. 370 (1806). Moreover,
the Articles provided that the use of such bodies was disfavored, because
Congress recognized that they “may be perverted to dishonorable purposes, and
may be considered as engines of destruction to military merit, in the hands of
weak and envious commandants . . . .” Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for
the Gov’t of Armies of the U.S., art. 92, 2 Stat. 370 (1806). As such, courts of
inquiry were prohibited “unless directed by the President of the United States, or
demanded by the accused.” Id. Needless to say, Jackson did not bother to follow
these procedural rules either. In any event, if the panel really was intended to be
an advisory body, then it did not function as a judicial tribunal of any sort, much
less a “regularly constituted court,” and its advice thus cannot plausibly serve as
precedent for criminal proceedings in a modern military commission. Arguably,
the Government cannot have it both ways.
139 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 629.
140 Id.; see also 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 618 (1819) (“The fifty-sixth and seventh
articles cannot be construed to extend to foreigners, but are evidently intended to
operate on our own citizens only, who shall be found guilty of aiding, abetting,
comforting, or corresponding with the enemy.”).
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what made them outlaws . . . . Jackson’s allies derided their
opponents’ arguments as narrowly legalistic, and . . . generally
adopted aggressive antilegalist positions.”141 This position should
temper any comfort the Government derives from the fact that
Congress, divided sharply along partisan lines, failed to censure
Jackson, which hardly constitutes a ringing vindication of the
legality of his conduct. Tellingly, once the political crisis had
passed, the next Congress (including eighteen members who had
taken Jackson’s side in the censure debate) quietly voted to
eliminate his position as a Major General under the guise of
reducing the size of the Army in a cost-cutting measure.
“Ostensibly in the interest of the budget,” Heidler notes, Congress
thus “removed Andrew Jackson from the military establishment of
the United States” with the assent of President Monroe and
Secretary Calhoun.142
Lastly, even if one assumes (against the weight of the evidence)
that the tribunal was intended to be a military commission, rather
than an illegally constituted court martial, Jackson’s rationalization
for the executions was cast in sweeping and ambiguous terms. “It
is an established principle of the law of nations,” Jackson asserted,
“that any individual of a nation making war against the citizens of
another nation, they being at peace, forfeits his allegiance, and
becomes an outlaw and pirate . . . .”143
While it is not entirely clear what Jackson meant to assert, he
cannot be reasonably interpreted as literally accusing Arbuthnot
and Ambrister of piracy, which as he surely knew was defined as
robbery on the high seas.144 Nor could the pair technically have
been described as “outlaws” as that term was understood at
common law.145 Instead, the most plausible interpretation of
Rosen, supra note 52, at 577–79.
Heidler, supra note 56, at 529. The idea of eliminating Jackson’s position
had been proposed as an alternative to censure during the House debate. See 33
ANNALS OF CONG. 799 (1819) (“The adoption of the resolution is . . . essential to the
preservation of our present Military Establishment. If the resolutions fail, the
army ought to be, and will be reduced.”).
143 Robert Butler, Adjutant General, Head-Quarters Division of the South,
General Orders, 29 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:734.
144 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820) (Story, J.)
(holding that “piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea”).
145 If a defendant repeatedly failed to appear after being indicted, a writ of
outlawry could be issued to compel his submission to the court’s jurisdiction. In
the medieval period, this must have been a frightening prospect because it put the
141
142
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Jackson’s dictum is that, by voluntarily taking sides in a conflict in
which their own government was neutral, Arbuthnot and
Ambrister had been engaged in a kind of illegitimate, private
warfare. As a result, like pirates captured on the high seas, Jackson
regarded them as de facto stateless persons who had forfeited the
protection of the law and were therefore subject to summary
battlefield execution.
Aside from the fact that no military exigency justified
depriving the defendants of the rudimentary incidents of due
process, it is by no means clear that Arbuthnot and Ambrister had
engaged in hostilities against the United States. In particular,
Jackson’s purported outrage that British neutrals would supply
goods and services to the Seminoles was flatly inconsistent with
the prevailing American understanding of the law of neutrality.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States was the
leading proponent of the freedom of neutral commerce,146 a policy
it would consistently maintain even when it was in the position of
a belligerent.147 As early as 1796, when the French foreign minister
insisted that the United States was obligated to prevent its
merchants from selling contraband goods to the British, Attorney
General Charles Lee advised President Washington that:
offender beyond the protection of the law and the offender thus “might be killed
with impunity and his lands forfeited to the state.” G. S. Rowe, Outlawry in
Pennsylvania, 1782-1788 and the Achievement of an Independent State Judiciary, 20 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 227, 229 (1976). Even so, the practice of subjecting fugitives to
summary execution was effectively prohibited by judicial decision by the late 14th
century. See Ralph B. Pugh, Early Registers of English Outlaws, 27 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 319, 319 (1983) (“Until Edward III’s early days offenders could be killed on
sight, but thenceforth, by an oblique judicial decision, such a fate was effectively
forbidden . . . .”).
146 See William C. Morley, The Sale of Munitions of War, 10 AM. J. INT’L L. 467,
472 (1916) (“It was the policy of the United States, more than any other single
influence, that tended to give definiteness to [the law of neutrality]. In the midst
of the European wars that followed the French Revolution, the United States was
the chief neutral nation whose commercial rights were placed in jeopardy.”).
147 See 2 JAMES W. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 384–85
(1920).
The policy of the United States, when it was a belligerent, in respect of
the right of neutrals to sell and export munitions of war, has uniformly
been in accordance with the view which it has defended as a neutral, and
it does not appear that in any war in which t was a belligerent formal
protest by the government against the furnishing of war supplies to the
enemy was ever made.
Id.
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If a citizen of a neutral State, for hire, serves as a mariner on
board of a neutral ship employed in contraband commerce
with either of the belligerent powers, he is not . . .
punishable personally, according to the law of nations,
though taken in the fact, by that belligerent nation to whose
detriment the prohibited trade would operate. In such a
case, the contraband merchandise, and the vessel too,
(unless excepted by treaty,) may be seized and confiscated;
. . . but the mariner, rendering personal service, suffers no
penalty or loss whatever . . . .148
The same rule applied when the contraband goods were being
furnished to insurgents waging an undeclared war of
independence against their sovereign. Thus, in the context of a
conflict between Spain and rebels in the colony of Buenos Aries,
Justice Story merely expressed the conventional view when he
observed that:
[T]here is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that
forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as
munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a
commercial adventure which no nation is bound to
prohibit; and which only exposes the persons engaged in it
to the penalty of confiscation.149
Accordingly, Arbuthnot and Ambrister’s provision of material
support to the Seminoles did not necessarily violate their neutral
status vis-à-vis the United States. By all appearances, Ambrister’s
training program had been directed primarily at Spain, and when
the actual fighting began, he withdrew rather than take up arms
against Jackson’s forces. Meanwhile, Arbuthnot’s sale of goods to
the Seminoles in the ordinary course of his business was clearly
148 Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y. Gen. 61, 62 (1796); see also 7 JOHN B. MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 955–73 (1906) (citing additional U.S. diplomatic
sources).
149 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 340 (1822).

[N]eutrals may lawfully sell, at home, to a belligerent purchaser, or
carry, themselves, to the belligerent powers, contraband articles subject
to the right of seizure, in transit. . . . The right of the neutral to transport,
and of the hostile power to seize, are conflicting rights, and neither party
can charge the other with a criminal act.
See also 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 141–42 (1840) (1826).
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legitimate neutral commerce, even if the Seminoles used them in
combat. As subsequently codified in the Hague Neutrality
Convention of 1907, which was merely declaratory of extant
international law,150 “[s]upplies furnished or loans made to one of
the belligerents” were not considered “hostile acts against [the
other] belligerent,” provided the supplier violated no duty of
allegiance by reason of his presence in territory under the
jurisdiction of the injured State.151
Moreover, Jackson’s dictum begs the question in any event
because the mere fact that the citizen of a neutral State abandons
his neutrality is not ipso facto a violation of the law of war. It is
perfectly true, of course, that private citizens do not have a license
to engage in acts of violence in the context of an armed conflict.
Private citizens who commit acts of violence “without the
authority or sanction of their own government,” Henry Halleck
explained on the eve of the Civil War, are not considered “enemies,
legitimately in arms,” and thus are not entitled “to plead the laws
of war in . . . justification” of their actions.152 In the absence of
combatant immunity, it follows that “when captured, they are not
treated as prisoners of war, but as criminals, subject to the
punishment due their crimes.”153 Hence, “[t]he taking of property
by such forces . . . is not a belligerent act authorized by the law of
nations, but a robbery,” and “the killing of an enemy by such forces
. . . is not an act of war, but a murder,” unless the defendant acted in
self-defense.154 And while civilian offenses of this sort might be
tried by military authorities in circumstances justifying the
imposition of martial law or military government, Halleck does not
suggest that such defendants, though “regarded as outlaws” in a
colloquial sense, were placed beyond the pale of due process.155
150 See generally Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1
Bevans 654 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).
151 Id. art. 17–18.
152 HALLECK, supra note 32, at 386.
153 Id. at 386–87.
154 Id. at 386.
155 Id. at 387; see also WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 842 (explaining that military
commissions “will ordinarily and properly be governed, upon all important
questions, by the established rules and principles of law and evidence. Where
essential, indeed, to a full investigation or to the doing of justice, these rules and
principles will be liberally construed and applied”); Jno. C. Kelton, Assistant
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Thus, even on the counterfactual assumption that Arbuthnot and
Ambrister were “individuals waging private war,” Henry Clay
observed, they were not properly subject to the jurisdiction of
Jackson’s military tribunal, but rather “should have been turned
over to the civil authority.”156
Conversely, Clay’s analysis continued, if one assumes that
Arbuthnot and Ambrister abandoned their neutral status by
directly joining the Seminoles’ cause, they were no more subject to
immediate execution than the Seminoles themselves:
A foreigner, connecting himself with a belligerent, becomes
an enemy of the party to whom that belligerent is opposed,
subject to whatever he may be subject, entitled to whatever
he is entitled. Arbuthnot and Ambrister, by associating
themselves, became identified with the Indians; they
became our enemies, and . . . all that we could possibly
have a right to do was to apply to them the rules which we
had a right to enforce against the Indians. . . . [I]f the law
regulating Indian hostilities . . . [gives us] no moral right to
retaliate upon them, we consequently had no right to
retaliate upon Arbuthnot and Ambrister.157

Adjutant-Gen., Hdqrs. Dept. of the Missouri, General Orders No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1862),
in 1 WAR OF REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, 247, 248 (Series 2, 1894) (promulgating order of Maj.
Gen. Halleck directing that military commissions “should be . . . constituted in a
similar manner and their proceedings be conducted according to the same general
rules as courts-martial in order to prevent abuses which might otherwise arise”).
156 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 641 (1819).
157 Id. at 641–42. This principle of parity is also supported by the Hague
Convention, which provides that if a neutral citizen “enlists in the ranks of the
armed force of one of the parties . . . [he] shall not be more severely treated by the
belligerent as against whom he has abandoned his neutrality than a national of
the other belligerent State could be for the same act.” See Hague Convention V
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War
on Land, supra note 150, at art. 17(b).
If war be declared by the Cherokee nation, and one of them kill one of
the people against whom the war is declared, he is not therefore subject
to be punished as a criminal, because he is acting under the authority
and laws of his nation. He can not, by carrying on war against us, be
treated as a traitor or rebel . . . .
Holland v. Pack, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 151, 153 (1823); WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 639,
667, 670, 778 (noting that the laws of war apply to armed conflict with an Indian
tribe).
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Indeed, as the House Military Affairs Committee pointed out,
the implications of Jackson’s dictum were quite far reaching. If this
was a correct statement of the law of war, it would imply that
“Lafayette, who volunteered his services in the cause of America,
in the war which established our independence, forfeited his
allegiance, became an outlaw, and subjected himself to an
ignominious death, had he fallen into the hands of the English.”158
6.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of history has not been kind to Andrew Jackson’s
conduct during the First Seminole War.
As one historian
summarizes the evidence, “his actions were a study in flagrant
disobedience, gross inequality, and premeditated ruthlessness. . . .
He swept through Florida, crushed the Indians, executed . . .
Arbuthnot and Ambrister, and . . . violated nearly every standard
of justice.”159 Not surprisingly, once the Government’s embrace of
this episode as a precedent for a contemporary war crimes
prosecution filtered into the public consciousness, it prompted a
sharply-worded response from the Native American community.
In a letter submitted to the court, the National Congress of
American Indians (NCAI) castigated the prosecutors’ decision to
rely on a direct comparison between the Seminoles and al Qaeda as
“an astonishing statement of revisionist history,” which, in turn,
“calls into question the reasoning and judgment of those who are
representing the United States in this case.”160
Stung by this criticism, the Government filed a rejoinder to the
NCAI’s letter, but its attempt at “clarification” arguably descends
from the merely offensive into incoherence.
Perhaps most
importantly, the Government flatly contradicts itself by suggesting
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 517 (1819).
Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Andrew Jackson’s Honor, 17 J. EARLY REP. 1, 3 (1997)
(quoting historian John William Ward).
160 Brief for National Congress of American Indians as Amicus Curiae to
Appellee, United States v. al Bahlul at *1-2, CMCR Case No. 09-001, 2011 WL
3836524 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Mar. 17, 2011). In addition, representatives of
the 3,600 living descendants of the Seminoles wrote letters to President Obama
and Secretary of Defense Gates protesting the Government’s brief. See generally
Letter from Mitchell Cypress, Chairman, Seminole Tribe of Fla., to Barack Obama,
President of the United States (Mar. 24, 2011) (on file with author); Letter from Jim
Shore, General Counsel, Seminole Tribe of Fla., to Robert M. Gates, United States
Secretary of Defense (Mar. 24, 2011) (on file with author).
158
159
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that it had never intended to “equate the conduct of the Seminoles .
. . with that of al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups,” which
abandons the major premise of the argument.161 We should recall,
if need be, that this is an exercise in the familiar common law
method of reasoning by analogy. Hence, if the conduct of the
Seminoles and their black allies during the First Seminole War is
not relevantly similar to the tactics employed by present-day
terrorists, as the Government belatedly seems to concede, it follows
that the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister was based on the
mistaken belief that they were aiding “savages” engaged in an
unlawful belligerency. And in that case, it is unreasonable to
conclude that their deaths were anything other than a tragedy.
The Government attempts to resist this conclusion by further
abandoning any pretense of moral legitimacy, arguing instead that
the executions are not being cited “as an example of moral right,
but as legal precedent; the morality or propriety of General
Jackson’s military operation in Florida is irrelevant.”162 While
allowing that “Jackson’s campaign into northern Florida in 1818,
and his treatment of the Seminoles during that campaign” were
“repugnan[t],” the Government makes the striking claim that “the
relevance of the Ambrister and Arbuthnot precedent” is grounded
on nothing more than “Jackson’s treatment of those acts as
violations of the law of war,” which was subsequently ratified by
“the then-Secretary of State and the then-President of the United
States.”163 “[F]or the purposes of this case,” the Government
submits, “the true facts concerning . . . Jackson’s campaign into
northern Florida” may be safely “[p]ut[] aside.”164 We are thus
entitled to conclude that the legal basis of the Government’s
assertion of military jurisdiction over material support charges
rests entirely on a naked exercise of power by a general officer,
divorced entirely from the constraints of moral principle, in the
161 Appellee’s Response to Letter Brief Amicus Curiae of National Congress
of American Indians [hereinafter Government’s Response to NCAI] at 1–2, United
States v. al Bahlul, CMCR Case No. 09-001, 2011 WL 3836524 (U.S. Ct. Mil.
Comm’n Rev. Mar. 21, 2011). It is simply not possible to square this denial with
the Government’s initial response to the court’s certified questions, in which it
equates the Seminole’s conduct with the conduct of al-Qaeda. See also supra text
accompanying notes 43–46.
162 Government’s Response to NCAI, supra note 161, at 2.
163 Id. (emphasis added).
164 Id. (emphasis added).
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context of a war of aggression waged to vindicate the property
rights of antebellum Southern slaveholders.
For the Government to suggest that this precedent remains
good law in a modern war crimes prosecution is not unlike citing
Dred Scott for the sanctity of property rights, while remaining
willfully blind to the fact that it has been decisively repudiated as a
respectable constitutional precedent. Indeed, Dred Scott has never
been formally overruled by the Supreme Court, and one might
even construct a plausible argument that, viewed in its historical
context, the case was “correctly” decided given the existing state of
the law.165 But while that might be an interesting pedagogical
exercise, an experienced constitutional lawyer would surely
consider it a professional gaffe to cite the decision on its merits in a
living case. “There is a broader point that extends beyond
doctrinal minutiae,” Jamal Greene writes, “Dred Scott does not
gnaw at us because it misused syllogism or invented constitutional
rights; we hate it because it abided constitutional evil.”166 The
decision to reject such a case from the canon of acceptable
precedent thus involves a deliberative moral judgment that
expresses “the attitude the [relevant] constitutional interpretive
community takes toward the ethical propositions that the decision
has come to represent.”167 The cases that fail to satisfy this
normative test “are not the law; they are its opposite. Their
holdings cannot reasonably be relied upon . . . .”168
From a critical moral perspective, my suggestion is that in its
zeal to defend a tenuous legal theory, the Government has
overlooked the profound conceptual difference between history
and tradition. As Stephen Macedo observes, “[a] nation’s history
[including its legal history] is simply the record of its past, some
good, some bad. America’s history includes lynching and racism
and other practices that no decent and reasonable person could be

165 See generally MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 1 (2006) (arguing that “the result in Dred Scott . . . may have
been constitutionally correct” as decided, in light of the fact that the
“constitutional text and tradition [were] saturated with concessions to evil”).
166 Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
*31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776488.
167 Id. at *2.
168 Id. at *3.
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proud of.”169 America’s tradition, on the other hand, “is made up
of those practices and ideals that her people properly take pride in.
Tradition is a critical distillation of the past, a rendering that seeks
to be true not to the past entire but to what is best in it, to what is
most honourable and most worth carrying forward.”170
A legal tradition thus has a certain moral authority that makes
a claim on our allegiance, insofar as it embodies a conception of
justice that coheres “with our deeper understanding of ourselves
and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and
the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable
doctrine for us.”171 In this sense, we should be loath to accept the
Government’s jarring invitation to incorporate Andrew Jackson’s
summary trial and execution of two innocent men into the
tradition of American military justice.172

169 STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 171 (1990).
170
171

(1980).

CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE,

AND

COMMUNITY

Id.
John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 519

172 As this essay was about to go to press, the CMCR issued its long awaited
decisions in Hamdan and al Bahlul. In Hamdan, the court uncritically accepted
the Government’s assertion that this incident supports the proposition that
material support for “irregular warfare” is an established war crime, even where
the defendant owes no duty of allegiance to the injured State, albeit professing to
take “no comfort in the historical context in which these events occurred.” United
States v. Hamdan, No. 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *29 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev.
June 24, 2011) (en banc). To be sure, the court cites a variety of additional legal
materials that purportedly support its holding, including cases that the
Government had conceded were irrelevant, while conspicuously omitting any
reference to the contrary authority cited by the appellant. See supra text
accompanying notes 32–42. In al Bahlul, the court also affirmed the appellant’s
conviction for providing material support for terrorism, but omitted any reference
to Jackson’s execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister. See United States v. al Bahlul,
No. 09-001, 2011 WL 4916373 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Sept. 9, 2011) (en banc).
A full analysis of these opinions is beyond the scope of this essay. I am content to
allow readers to exercise their own judgment, in light of the evidence presented
here, about whether the CMCR’s reliance on this precedent undermines the
persuasive authority of its reasoning.
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